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I develop an asset-pricing model in which ﬁnancial assets are valued for their liquidity–the extent to
which they are useful in facilitating exchange–as well as for being claims to streams of consumption
goods. The implications for average asset returns, the equity-premium puzzle and the risk-free rate
puzzle, are explored in a version of the model that nests the work of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
∗First draft: May 2005. I am indebted to Ellen McGrattan and Fabrizio Perri for many helpful conversations
at various stages. I am grateful to Nobu Kiyotaki for his feedback as a discussant at the Princeton—NY Fed
Conference on Liquidity and the Philadelphia Workshop on Monetary and Macroeconomics. I thank V.V.
Chari, Mark Gertler, Patrick Kehoe, Narayana Kocherlakota, Hanno Lustig, Erzo G. J. Luttmer, Monika
Piazzesi, Ed Prescott, Guillaume Rocheteau, Tom Sargent, Martin Schneider, Pierre-Olivier Weill, Michael
Woodford, and Randy Wright for their input. I also thank Katya Kartashova for many useful comments on
previous drafts. Daniil Manaenkov, Carlos Serrano, and Jing Zhang provided research assistance. Financial
support from the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU is gratefully acknowledged. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper I develop an asset-pricing model in which ﬁnancial assets are valued not only as
claims to streams of consumption goods but also for their liquidity. By liquidity Im e a nt h e
degree to which an asset is valued as a medium of exchange at the margin. Speciﬁcally, I study
a class of exchange economies in which agents sometimes trade goods and ﬁnancial assets as in
Walrasian theory (in well-organized markets, at market-clearing prices), and sometimes as in
search theory (in a decentralized manner, with the terms of trade determined by bargaining).
Decentralized trade combined with an exchange motive generates the need for a medium of
exchange. The equilibrium price and rate of return of a ﬁnancial asset are partly determined
by the asset’s usefulness to facilitate exchange. When an asset is held partly for its exchange
value, its price will be higher, and its measured rate of return–which takes into account only
the stream of consumption goods that the asset represents–will be lower than they would be
if the asset were not used as a medium of exchange.
In Section 2, I consider an economy with two assets: an equity share and a one-period
government-issued risk-free real bill. In the basic setup, assets diﬀer only in their payoﬀs, and
agents are free to choose which assets to use as means of payment in decentralized trades. In
this case, the theory unambiguously predicts that someone testing an agent’s Euler equation
for the risk-free bill using its measured rate of return would ﬁnd that, at the margin, this agent
can gain from transferring consumption from the future to the present. That is, there would
appear to be a risk-free rate puzzle.
I also analyze versions of the economy in which institutional or legal restrictions give bonds
an advantage over equity as a medium of exchange. In this case, it is possible to show that there
are degrees of these restrictions for which someone testing an agent’s Euler equation for the
measured excess returns would ﬁnd that, at the margin, the agent can gain from disinvesting in
bills and investing in equity: there would appear to be an equity-premium puzzle. For this class
of economies, the risk-free rate would still seem too low to an outside observer. In fact, the risk-
1free rate will be even lower than it would be in the absence of institutional or legal restrictions.
Without these restrictions, the theory may still be consistent with an equity-premium puzzle,
depending on parameter values. These issues are analyzed in Section 3.
In Section 4, I calibrate the model economies and study the extent to which they are able
to generate average equity returns and risk-free rates that are in line with U.S. data. Since
the class of model economies I consider nests the one studied by Mehra and Prescott (1985),
I can quantify the degree to which the liquidity mechanism considered here can help explain
the anomalies they identiﬁed. Mehra and Prescott’s test of their theory essentially consisted of
experimenting with diﬀerent values of the curvature of the agent’s utility function (call it σ)t o
ﬁnd the values for which the average risk-free rate and equity premium in the model matched
those in the U.S. economy. I carry out a similar exercise.
First, I consider the economy with no legal or institutional diﬀerences between equity shares
and bills, and assess the ability of the model to produce risk-free rates and equity premia that
match the data for values of σ ranging from 1 to 10.I ﬁnd that for values of σ up to 7,t h e
liquidity mechanism is inactive, and the equilibrium looks just like the one in Mehra—Prescott.
For values of σ equal to or greater than 8, equity shares and bills are valuable in decentralized
exchange at the margin. This lowers the return on equity and the risk-free rate from what they
would be in the Mehra—Prescott economy and brings them closer to the data. However, relative
to the data, for this range of σ the equity return is a bit too low and the risk-free rate a bit too
high, so the average equity premium is still too low.
I also consider the speciﬁcation with legal or institutional restrictions, in which equity shares
cannot be used as means of payment in a fraction θ of decentralized exchanges. I report how
asset returns vary with θ in general and formulate the following question: For a given value of
σ,h o wl a r g ed o e sθ (the relative “illiquidity” of equity) have to be for the model to generate
an average risk-free rate of 1% and an average equity premium that matches the long-term
average for the U.S. economy? The answer is, quite small. Section 4.3 oﬀers a way to assess
the absolute size of the implied θ by relating it to relative trade volumes of equity and bonds.
2In Section 5, I discuss how the liquidity mechanism operates in this model, and what it adds
to the Mehra—Prescott model, by contrasting how the mean and standard deviation of their re-
spective stochastic discount factors fare against the bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).
In this section, I also use the model to decompose the equity premium into two components: a
pure risk premium for bearing nondiversiﬁable aggregate consumption risk, and an illiquidity
premium related to bonds being easier to trade away if a decentralized trade opportunity arises.
By now a vast literature seeks to solve the puzzle identiﬁed by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
As they framed it, the puzzle is the observation that the restrictions that a particular class
of general equilibrium models places upon average returns of equity and Treasury bills are
violated by U.S. data. This particular class of models has: (i) agents who maximize the
expected discounted value of a stream of utilities generated by a power utility function; (ii)
“frictionless” trading (e.g., no brokerage fees or other trading or transaction costs); and (iii)
complete asset markets (agents can write insurance contracts against any contingency).
The literature spurred by the work of Mehra and Prescott can be classiﬁed depending
on which of these ingredients it alters.1 Looked at from this angle, this paper relaxes (ii)
and (iii). There are trading frictions in the sense that agents sometimes trade bilaterally
instead of in a Walrasian marketplace. Markets are incomplete in that agents cannot make
binding commitments, and trading histories are private in a way that precludes any borrowing
and lending between people. Therefore, all trade–both in the centralized and decentralized
markets–must be quid pro quo. In terms of this broad taxonomy, this paper is related to
Aiyagari and Gertler (1991). They consider an economy with equity and government bonds in
which agents face idiosyncratic shocks, and markets are incomplete in a way that individual
agents must self-insure. In their model, agents hold assets not only for the stream of dividends
they yield but also as a vehicle of self-insurance. This alone can help to lower the risk-free rate.
The basic logic of this mechanism is similar to the one I am emphasizing, except that here,
the additional motive for holding assets is their role in transactions rather than self-insurance
1I will not attempt to list all the relevant work in the area. See Mehra and Prescott (2003) for references.
3considerations.2 At a conceptual level, the paper also shares the basic premise of Bansal and
Coleman (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), namely, that an asset’s role in facilitating
some form of exchange will manifest itself in the equity premium and as a risk-free rate puzzle.
This paper is also closely related to the literature that provides micro foundations for mon-
etary economics based on search theory, as pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This
approach has proven useful for understanding the nature of monetary exchange by making
explicit the frictions–e.g., the conﬁguration of meetings, specialization patterns, information
structure, and so on–that make monetary exchange an equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, this ap-
proach has proven useful in pricing the most elusive among ﬁnancial assets: ﬁat money, an asset
that is a formal claim to nothing yet sells at a positive price. Somehow, this literature and the
mainstream asset-pricing literature have managed to stay disconnected.3 Recently, Duﬃe, Gâr-
leanu, and Pedersen (2005a,b), Vayanos and Wang (2005), Vayanos and Weill (2005), and Weill
(2005a,b) have begun to build some interesting connections between both ﬁelds. They model
asset trading as a decentralized exchange process that resembles the original vintages of the
equilibrium search models of Diamond (1982) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This paper also
bridges these ﬁelds, in the precise sense that the model can be viewed as a blend of Lagos and
Wright (2005)–a recent vintage of the search-based model of exchange–and Lucas (1978).4
2To widen the spread between the risk-free rate and the return on equity, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) introduce
diﬀerential (proportional) trading costs across equity and bonds. If transaction costs on bonds are lower than
on equity, then in equilibrium equity must pay a premium, which they refer to as a “transactions/liquidity
premium.” They also emphasize the model implications for the volumes of trade for bonds and equity as a way of
assessing the plausibility of the magnitudes of the trading costs that they feed into the model. Heaton and Lucas
(1996) analyze an economy similar to the one in Aiyagari and Gertler, but they allow for aggregate uncertainty.
Other papers that consider various combinations of transaction costs and short-sale constraints include Telmer
(1993), Lucas (1994), He and Modest (1995), and Luttmer (1996). See Heaton and Lucas (1995) for a survey.
3Mehra and Prescott (1985) were the ﬁrst to point out the similarities between the equity premium puzzle
and the rate-of-return-dominance puzzle that pervades the pure theory of money. Kocherlakota (1996) picked
up on this theme in his concluding section. I will return to it in mine.
4Contemporaneously, Ravikumar and Shao (2005) are working on a related model that instead combines
features of Lucas (1978) with features of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Shi (1997). Our papers clearly share
m u c hg r o u n d :b o t hi n v e s t i g a t eh o wt h er o l et h a ta na s s e tp l a y si nt h ee x c h a n g ep r o c e s sa ﬀects its equilibrium
price. As for diﬀerences–aside from several in terms of modeling–their agents trade a single asset (equity),
as the model is designed to address the excess volatility puzzle rather than the equity premium puzzle and the
r i s k - f r e er a t ep u z z l e . So all in all, our work is decidedly complementary.
42 The model
There is a [0,1] continuum of agents, time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. Each period is
divided into two subperiods where diﬀerent activities take place. There are three nonstorable
and perfectly divisible consumption goods at each date: general goods,a n dt w ot y p e so ffruit,
which I will refer to as apples and coconuts. (By “nonstorable” I mean that the goods cannot
be carried from one subperiod to the next.) Let Zt be an aggregate productivity index, and
assume that Zt+1 = xt+1Zt, where xt+1 ∈ {γ1,...,γn} and Pr
¡
xt+1 = γj|xt = γi
¢
= µij.( T h e
conditional expectation, Et,u s e db e l o w ,i sd e ﬁned with respect to this transition probability.
Throughout, I will assume that the Markov chain is ergodic.) The realization of xt becomes
known at the beginning of period t.
The only durable commodity in the economy is a set of “Lucas trees.” The number of
trees is ﬁxed and equal to the number of agents. Trees yield a quantity dt = Zt of apples–
the “dividend”–in the second subperiod of every period. Production of apples is entirely
exogenous: no resources are utilized, and it is not possible to aﬀect the output at any time.
In the second subperiod, every agent is also endowed with ¯ n units of time and has access to
a linear production technology that allows him to transform each unit of time into Zt units of
general goods.5
In the ﬁrst subperiod, half of the agents are endowed with (1 +  )κZt coconuts, and the
remaining half with (1 −  )κZt coconuts, where   ∈ [0,1],a n dκ>0. Thus, the total endowment
of coconuts in period t equals κZt. The agents who receive the high endowment are selected
at random from the population at the beginning of each period, so from the perspective of an
individual agent, the endowment process is independent across periods.6 Note that there is a
precise sense in which Zt indexes the economy-wide state of technology: when Zt is relatively
5This formulation is in some sense the most straightforward integration of the asset-pricing model of Lucas
(1978) with the model of exchange in Lagos and Wright (2005). In a diﬀerent context, I have considered other
formulations, for example, one where instead of being consumption goods, apples are a necessary input–together
with labor–in the production of the general consumption good. (See the appendix to Lagos (2006) for details.)
6It would not be diﬃcult to allow the individual endowment process to be correlated over time. Reed and
Waller (2005) use a similar formulation in their study of monetary policy and risk sharing.
5high, the Lucas trees yield more apples, the technology that transforms labor into general goods
is more eﬃcient, and there is a larger aggregate endowment of coconuts.
Let u(Q) be the utility from consuming Q coconuts in the ﬁrst subperiod, and let U (c)
and v(y) represent the utilities from consuming c apples and y general goods in the second














where β ∈ (0,1), Qi
t is agent i’s consumption of coconuts in the ﬁrst subperiod, ci
t and yi
t are his
consumption of apples and general goods, and hi
t is his labor supply in the second subperiod.
The marginal disutility from working is At > 0.7 Assume u0 > 0, v0 > 0, U0 > 0, u00 < 0,
v00 ≤ 0,a n dU00 < 0.I ti sa l s oc o n v e n i e n tt oh a v eu0 (0) = v0 (0) = U0 (0) = +∞.
In the second subperiod, agents trade apples, labor, general goods, and ﬁnancial assets in
a centralized (Walrasian) market. In the ﬁrst subperiod, agents trade coconuts and ﬁnancial
assets in a decentralized market where trade is bilateral (each meeting is a random draw from
the set of pairwise meetings), and the terms of trade are determined by bargaining. Let ˆ α
denote the probability of a meeting. Bilateral trade, together with the fact that some agents
receive a high endowment and others a low endowment of coconuts, gives rise to a double-
coincidence-of-wants problem in the ﬁrst subperiod. There are two relevant types of meetings:
ˆ α/2 of them involve an agent with a high endowment and an agent with a low endowment
(naturally, in these “single-coincidence meetings,” the agent with the low endowment will be
the buyer and the other the seller); and ˆ α/2 of the meetings are “no-coincidence meetings”
that involve either two agents with high endowment or two agents with low endowment. Agents
cannot make binding commitments, and trading histories are private in a way that precludes any
borrowing and lending between people, so all trade–both in the centralized and decentralized
markets–must be quid pro quo.
7The t subscript on At is meant to allow for speciﬁcations where the disutility of work depends on the aggregate
technology index, Zt. The usefulness of such speciﬁcations has to do with balanced growth considerations, as
discussed below.
6Each tree has outstanding one durable and perfectly divisible equity share that represents
the bearer’s ownership of a tree and confers him the right to collect the apple dividends. There
is a second perfectly divisible asset, a one-period risk-free government-issued real bill. (Each
of these “bonds” pays oﬀ an apple at maturity.) Let Bt denote the stock of bonds that are
outstanding in period t, to be redeemed before the centralized trading session of period t.
(The government sells Bt+1 in the centralized market at the end of period t.) What I call the
“government” is essentially summarized by the budget constraint Bt = φb
tBt+1 + τt, where φb
t
is the price of a bond and τt a lump-sum tax levied on all agents during the centralized trading
session, both expressed in terms of apples. The focus here will not be on how the government
should select the path {Bt,τt}, but rather on characterizing the equilibrium, and in particular
asset prices and returns, given such a path. All assets are perfectly recognizable, cannot be
forged, and can be traded among agents in the centralized and decentralized markets. At t =0
each agent is endowed with as
0 equity shares and ab
0 units of the bond.
In the ﬁrst subperiod, endowment inequality gives agents a motive for trade. In addition, the
combination of bilateral meetings and quid pro quo trade generates the need for an asset to act as
a medium of exchange. But which of the two assets will play this role–bonds or equity shares?
From a theoretical standpoint, one could adhere to Wallace’s dictum (e.g., Wallace 1998) and
argue that in laying down the environment, one should specify assets only by their physical
properties, not by the role they play. That is, given the physical characteristics of the various
assets (their payoﬀs or other inherent properties such as their divisibility, recognizability, etc.),
the theory ought to determine their roles in exchange endogenously–as part of the equilibrium.
I consider a baseline version of the model that adheres to the dictum. In this version, assets
diﬀer only in their payoﬀs, and there are no exogenous liquidity diﬀerences between bonds and
equity shares: the agents in the model are free to choose which asset or combination of assets
to use in exchange. But since the focus of the paper is on a primarily applied question, namely,
the extent to which an asset’s usefulness in exchange aﬀects its measured return relative to
other assets, I also consider a more general formulation that allows for the possibility that
7bonds and equity shares may have diﬀerent exogenous liquidity properties. Speciﬁcally, I will
suppose that an agent can ﬁnd himself in two types of meetings in the decentralized market:
with probability θ2, he is in a meeting where he can use any of the two assets for payment,
whereas with probability θ1 =1− θ2, he is able to use only bonds.8 Thus, θ1 ∈ [0,1] indexes
the degree of “illiquidity” of equity shares. (The subscript refers to the number of assets that
can be used for payment in that particular type of meeting.) The formulation that satisﬁes
Wallace’s dictum corresponds to the special case of θ1 =0 . In the remainder of the section,
I describe the problems that agents face in both the decentralized and centralized markets,
characterize the terms of trade that will prevail in bilateral meetings, and introduce the notion
of equilibrium.
I begin by formulating the Bellman equations that summarize the individual agents’ opti-
mization problem. Let at ∈ R2





t denote the holdings of bonds and shares, respectively. Let
W (at+1,st+1) be the value of an agent who enters the centralized market holding portfolio at+1
in a period when the aggregate state of the economy is st+1 =( dt+1,x t+1,B t+1), i.e., in a period
when the realization of the endowment process is dt+1 = xt+1dt and there are Bt+1 bonds in
circulation. Similarly, let Vj (at+1,st+1) be the value of search for an agent who enters the
8To interpret the speciﬁc modeling choice, one can follow Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and relate θ1 to a
government transaction policy carried out by a small mass of government agents. This has become the standard
way of introducing legal or other institutional restrictions into environments with decentralized exchange. See,
for example, Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) or Li and Wright (1998). Also, more recently, Shi (2005) has
used a similar formulation in a model with ﬁat money and nominal bonds to study the eﬀects of open market
operations. He ﬁnds that even an arbitrarily small probability that matured nominal bonds will not be accepted
in decentralized exchange is enough for ﬁat money to drive them out of circulation. Regarding my use of this
device, I would like to emphasize that the spirit of this exercise is primarily positive.T h a t i s , h e r e I w a n t t o
explore the implications of (small) liquidity diﬀerences for the behavior of asset prices in general, and for the
equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles in particular. In fact, given the nature of the ﬁndings, I will argue
that understanding the deeper reasons for these diﬀerences in the liquidity of these assets–by which I mean the
diﬀerences in the likelihood they can serve as means of payment in decentralized exchange–is a necessary next
step. In terms of relating these theoretical institutional or legal restrictions to actual features of “real world”
trades, consider the following readily veriﬁable fact. An investor who places an order to sell shares of an S&P 500
ﬁrm on a given day T will typically have to wait until T +2for settlement, whereas the settlement for the sale
of 90-day U.S. Treasury bills will usually take place at T +1. These types of considerations seem to suggest that
bonds are a more readily available source of funds for agents who must act quickly on some purchase opportunity,
which is at least broadly in line with the trade-oﬀs at work in the theoretical formulation laid out here.
8decentralized market holding portfolio at+1 in a period when the aggregate state is st+1.T h e
subindex j ∈ {h,l} indicates whether the agent has a high (j = h)o ral o w( j = l)e n d o w m e n t
of coconuts.
Since there are, in general, two types of bilateral meetings–unrestricted matches where the
b u y e rc a nu s eb o t ha s s e t sa sm e a n so fp a y m e n t ,a n dr e s t r i c t e dm a t c h e sw h e r eh ec a nu s eo n l y
bonds–there are two sets of terms of trade in the decentralized market. The terms of trade
in a meeting of type i b e t w e e nab u y e rw i t hp o r t f o l i oat =( ab
t,a s
t) and a seller with portfolio
˜ at =( ˜ ab
t,˜ as
t) are [qi(at,˜ at),pi(at,˜ at)], where pi(at,˜ at) ∈ R2
+ is the portfolio that the buyer




















){u[(1 +  )κd]+W (a,s)},




















){u[(1 −  )κd]+W (a,s)}.
The expected value of an agent entering the decentralized market with portfolio a in a
period when the aggregate state is s, before knowing his endowment of coconuts, is V (a,s)=
1


























a + pi (˜ a,a),s
¤ª
dG(˜ a)
+(1− 2α)[¯ u(d)+W (a,s)],
9In an unrestricted match (i =2 , with probability θ2), p
2(at,˜ at)=[ p
b(at,˜ at),p
s(at,˜ at)],w h e r ep
b(at,˜ at)
denotes the quantity of bonds and p
s(at,˜ at) the quantity of shares that the buyer hands over to the seller. In
restricted matches (i =1 , with probability θ1), p
1(at,˜ at)=[ p
b(at,˜ at),0].
9where α ≡ ˆ α/4,a n d¯ u(d) ≡ 1
2 {u[(1 +  )κd]+u[(1 −  )κd]}.10
The value function of an agent who enters the centralized market with portfolio at in a
period when the aggregate state is st satisﬁes
W (at,st)= m a x
ct,yt,nt,ht,at+1
{U (ct)+v (yt) − Atht + βEtV (at+1,st+1)}
s.t. ct + wtnt + φtat+1 =( φs
t + dt)as
t + ab
t + wtht − τt
0 ≤ ct, 0 ≤ nt, 0 ≤ ht ≤ ¯ n, 0 ≤ at+1, yt = Ztnt.
The agent chooses consumption of apples (ct) and of the general good (yt), how many hours
of work to demand (nt)a n ds u p p l y( ht), and an end-of-period portfolio (at+1). Dividends are
paid to the bearer of the equity share after decentralized trade, but before the time-t centralized
trading session. Apples are used as numeraire, wt is the real wage, φb
t the real price of a bond,
φs
t the real price of a share (ex-dividend), with φt =( φb
t,φ s
t),a n dτt is a lump-sum tax also





t,a n dλt =( λb
t,λ s
t).S u b s t i t u t i n g
the budget constraint and yt = Ztnt into the objective, the problem becomes
W (at,st)=λtat − λb














φtat+1 + βEV (at+1,st+1)
¸
, (1)
with ht = 1
wt
£





,a n ds u b j e c tt o0 ≤ ct, 0 ≤ nt,
0 ≤ at+1,a n d0 ≤ ht ≤ ¯ n.11
Consider a meeting of type i in the decentralized market between a buyer holding portfolio
a and a seller holding ˜ a. The terms of trade [qi(a,˜ a),pi(a,˜ a)],f o ri =1 ,2, are determined by
10Note that this expression for the value of search is essentially the same as the one in Lagos (2006), except
that here, the utility gain of a buyer is u[(1 −  )κd+q
i (a,˜ a)]−u[(1 −  )κd] instead of u[q
i (a,˜ a)], the utility cost
of a seller is u[(1 +  )κd]−u[(1 +  )κd−q
i (˜ a,a)] instead of e[q
i (˜ a,a)], and agents without a trade opportunity
consume (1 +  )κd or (1 −  )κd,e a c hw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yah a l f ,i n s t e a do f0 with certainty.
11Note that the choice of next period portfolio, at+1, is independent of the current portfolio, at.T h u s ,a si n
Lagos and Wright (2005), a unique solution to the portfolio maximization problem implies that the distribution of
portfolios, G, must be degenerate (and equal to the mean holding) in the equilibrium, as long as ht is interior. In
the appendix (Section A.2), I derive parametric conditions such that this is indeed the case along the equilibrium
path. The nonnegativity constraints on ct and nt will not bind because U
0 (0) = v
0 (0) = +∞. Also, bonds and
shares will be valued in equilibrium, and someone has to hold them. Thus, 0 ≤ at+1 will not bind either.







(1 −  )κd + qi¤




(1 +  )κd − qi¤
+ W(˜ a + pi,s) − u[(1 +  )κd] − W(˜ a,s) ≥ 0,
and subject to p1 =( pb,0) and pb ≤ ab if i =1(matches where only bonds can be used as
means of payment), or subject to p2 =( pb,p s) ≤ a if i =2(matches where both bonds and
shares can be used for payment). The agent cannot spend more than all the assets he owns
in an unrestricted match, nor more than all the bonds he owns in a restricted match. In what
follows, I will refer to these trading constraints as “liquidity constraints.” Deﬁne the function
q(z;y):R2
+ → R+ as
q(z;y)=
½
 y if z ≥ u[(1 +  )y] − u(y)
ˆ q(z;y) if z<u[(1 +  )y] − u(y),
where ˆ q(z;y) denotes the q that solves u[(1 +  )y]−u[(1 +  )y−q]=z. Then, for i =1 ,2,t h e
bargaining solution in period t has qi(at,˜ at)=q(λi




Given the dividend process {dt}
∞
t=0 and a path {Bt,τt}
∞
t=0, an equilibrium is an allocation
{ct,y t,n t,h t,at+1}
∞
t=0,t o g e t h e rw i t has e to fp r i c e s{wt,φt}
∞
t=0 and bilateral terms of trade
{(qi
t)i=1,2}∞
t=0,s u c ht h a t : ( i) the individual choices {ct,y t,n t,h t,at+1}
∞
t=0 solve the agent’s
p r o b l e mi nt h ec e n t r a l i z e dm a r k e t ,g i v e np r i c e s ;( ii) the terms of trade in bilateral meetings are




t = q(λtat;κdt);a n d( iii)p r i c e sa r e
such that the centralized market clears, i.e., ct = dt, ab
t+1 = Bt+1, as
t+1 =1 , and the government
budget constraint, Bt = φb
tBt+1 + τt,i ss a t i s ﬁed.
12In the appendix (Section A.5), I study the general case in which the buyer has bargaining power η ∈ [0,1],
both analytically and quantitatively.
113 The equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles




































t+1at+1,κd t+1) for i =1 ,2,w i t hλb








at+1 =( Bt+1,1),a n dθ ≡ θ1.13 The factors Ls
t+1 and Lb
t+1 have a natural interpretation as the
liquidity returns from holding shares and bonds, respectively. Note that Li
t+1 ≥ 1 for i = b,s,
with strict inequality if the trading constraint pi ≤ a in the decentralized market is binding.
To illustrate, let θ =0 , i.e., suppose that all matches are unrestricted. Then, Ls
t+1 = Lb
t+1 =
Lt+1 in all states. In a state st+1 in which λt+1at+1 <u[(1 +  )κdt+1] − u(κdt+1),b u y e r sd o
not have enough real value of assets to buy  κdt+1,s oLt+1 > 1.I n f a c t , Lt+1 − 1 is the
slope of the gains from trade that accrue to the buyer, or equivalently, Lt+1 is the expected
marginal beneﬁt that the buyer gets from bringing the value of an additional apple’s worth
of liquidity into the search market, i.e., Lt+1 =( 1− α)+α
∂qt+1
∂(λt+1at+1)u0 [(1 −  )κdt+1 + qt+1].
With probability (1 − α) the agent has no use for the asset in the decentralized market, and
hence he gets no additional return from holding it. But with probability α he is a buyer
in the search market, and the additional value of assets he brings into the meeting allows
him to obtain
∂qt+1
∂(λt+1at+1) additional coconuts from the seller, which at the margin, he (the
buyer) values at u0 [(1 −  )κdt+1 + qt+1].S i n c e
∂qt+1
∂(λt+1at+1) = 1
u0[(1+ )κdt+1−qt+1],w eh a v eLt+1 =
(1 − α)+α
u0[(1− )κdt+1+qt+1]
u0[(1+ )κdt+1−qt+1], which corresponds to (4) with θ =0 .I n a s t a t e st+1 in which
13The Euler equations (2) and (3) are derived in the appendix (Section A.1).
12the agent has enough real value of assets to aﬀord the quantity of coconuts that maximizes the
gains from trade, namely,  κdt+1,h ew i l lb u yqt+1 =  κdt+1 coconuts, and therefore, Lt+1 =1 .
In general, for θ ∈ (0,1], (4) and (5) imply 1 ≤ Ls
t+1 ≤ Lb
t+1. The second inequality is due
to the fact that bonds provide liquidity (they can be used to relax the trading constraint at the
margin) whenever shares do, but in addition, they can also be used as means of payment in the






t denote the measured return on equity between period t and t +1 ,
i.e., the return that would be computed by a ﬁnancial analyst, which includes capital gains




denote the measured return on bonds between






t+1,t h efull (liquidity
augmented) returns, as perceived by an agent in the model. With these deﬁnitions, and letting
Mt+1 = β
U0(dt+1)
U0(dt) , (2) and (3) lead to
Et[Mt+1(Rs
t+1 − Rb
t+1)] = 0 (6)
Et(Mt+1Rb
t+1 − 1) = 0, (7)
a pair of statistical restrictions on the marginal rate of substitution and equilibrium asset
returns.14 Using the deﬁnitions of Ri
t+1 and ˆ Ri
t+1, the unconditional counterparts of (6) and
(7) can be written as
E[Mt+1( ˆ Rs
t+1 − ˆ Rb
t+1)] = ωe (8)
E(Mt+1 ˆ Rb







t+1 − 1) ˆ Rb
t+1 − (Ls















t+1 =1 ), the measured




t+1 for i = b,s, and (6) and (7) are equivalent to (2a) and (2b) in
Kocherlakota (1996), except for the fact that his expressions assume U (c)=
c1−σ
1−σ .
13Note that if neither asset provides liquidity services in any state (Li
t+1 − 1=0 ), then ˆ Ri
t+1 =
Ri
t+1 and ωe = ωb =0 , so (8) and (9) reduce to (2a’) and (2b’) in Kocherlakota (1996).15
Using actual data, one could estimate the expectations on the left-hand sides of (8) and (9)





















t+1 − 1. (13)
A vast body of work has been devoted to trying to rationalize the ﬁnding that for standard
parametrizations of preferences, the statistical restrictions ˆ ωe =ˆ ωb =0are violated by U.S.





t is constructed using the Standard and Poor’s
stock index for φs
t and the real dividends for the Standard and Poor’s series for dt,a n dt h a t ˆ Rb
t





is a measure of per capita consumption), one ﬁnds ˆ ωe > 0 and ˆ ωb < 0 for “reasonable” values of
σ. (For example, Tables 2 and 3 in Kocherlakota (1996) report ˆ ωe > 0 for σ ≤ 8.5 and ˆ ωb < 0
for σ ≥ 0.5.) The ﬁnding that ˆ ωe > 0 constitutes the equity premium puzzle while ˆ ωb < 0 is
commonly referred to as the risk-free rate puzzle.
The statistics ˆ ωe and ˆ ωb that deﬁne these puzzles are constructed using the measured returns
ˆ Rs
t+1 and ˆ Rb
t. But according to the theory developed in the previous sections, agents price
assets using the full returns Rs
t+1 and Rb
t+1, that is, the measured returns augmented by their
respective liquidity factors, Ls
t+1 and Lb
t+1. To the extent that agents experience liquidity needs
in some states, the theory does not imply that ˆ ωe =ˆ ωb =0 .I nf a c t ,ωe and ωb, the theoretical
counterparts to ˆ ωe and ˆ ωb, will not be zero if the assets are held partly for their exchange value.
From (11) it is clear that ωb =0if Lb
t+1 =1in all states, i.e., if bonds never provide liquidity
s e r v i c e s .I nt h i sc a s e ,c o n d i t i o n( 9 )s t a t e st h a tg i v e nt h em e a s u r e de x p e c t e dr e t u r no nb o n d s ,a t
the margin, the investor must be indiﬀerent between consuming an apple or saving it by using
15Kocherlakota’s (2a’) has been divided through by β and contains a typo (the marginal rate of substitution
appears as (Ct+1Ct)
−σ instead of (Ct+1/Ct)
−σ).
14it to purchase bonds. In this context, the ﬁnding that ˆ ωb < 0 is puzzling because it indicates
that the investor could gain by shifting consumption from the future to the present (by saving
less in the form of bonds and consuming more today). Or put diﬀerently, it appears that the
investor is too willing to hold bonds given their relatively low rate of return. But suppose that
bonds sometimes oﬀer liquidity services, i.e., suppose that Lb
t+1 > 1 at least in some state. Then
(11) immediately implies ωb < 0: the theory unambiguously predicts that someone testing the
agent’s Euler equation for the risk-free bill using its measured rate of return ˆ Rb
t+1 would ﬁnd
that at the margin, this agent can gain from transferring consumption from the future to the
present. That is, there would appear to be a risk-free rate puzzle. But this is not a puzzle from
the point of view of the model, since the full return on bonds, Lb
t+1 ˆ Rb
t+1, on average exceeds the
measured return ˆ Rb
t+1, which ignores the liquidity return. Notice that the model is qualitatively
consistent with the risk-free rate puzzle for any value of θ, including θ =0 ,i . e . ,e v e nw i t h o u t
assuming exogenous liquidity diﬀerences between equity shares and bonds.
From (10) it is clear that Lb
t+1 = Ls
t+1 =1implies ωe =0 . That is, in a world with no
liquidity needs, the measured returns ˆ Rs
t+1 and ˆ Rb
t+1 have to be such that at the margin, the
agent cannot gain by substituting from bonds into stocks, or vice versa. In this context, the
ﬁnding that ˆ ωe > 0 is puzzling because it indicates that the investor could gain by shifting
his portfolio from bonds to stocks. Or put diﬀerently, it appears that the investor is too
willing to hold bonds vis-à-vis stocks given that, according to the measured returns, equity
pays such a large premium over bonds. But suppose that θ =1 . Then (10) becomes ωe =
E[Mt+1(Lb
t+1 − 1) ˆ Rb
t+1] ≥ 0, with strict inequality if bonds provide liquidity in some state.
In this case, according to the theory, someone testing the investor’s Euler equation for the
measured excess returns would ﬁnd that, at the margin, the agent can gain from disinvesting
in bonds and investing more in equity. There would appear to be an equity-premium puzzle
because if there are liquidity needs but equity shares cannot be used to satisfy them, equity
must pay an illiquidity premium over bonds, and this shows up as a wedge ωe > 0.
The model can generate ωe > 0 even if θ =0 , i.e., even if no advantage in exchange
15is given to bonds over stocks. In this case, Lb
t+1 = Ls
t+1 = Lt+1, and (10) becomes ωe =
E[Mt+1(Lt+1 − 1)( ˆ Rb
t+1 − ˆ Rs
t+1)].T h ew e d g eωe is a weighted average of the measured return
diﬀerentials between bonds and equity over states. The sign of ωe is ambiguous in general.
But, for example, suppose there is a high- and a low-growth state and that ( ˆ Rb
t+1 − ˆ Rs
t+1) is
positive in the low state and negative in the high state. Then if the “weight” Mt+1(Lt+1 − 1)
tends to be larger in the low state, the model will generate ωe > 0. Thus, even without legal
or institutional restrictions that give bonds an advantage over equity as a medium of exchange,
the theory can still be consistent with an equity-premium puzzle. In fact, in the calibration of
Section 4, I will ﬁnd that for some values of risk aversion, the model with θ =0conforms with
this reasoning, and as a result, it indeed implies ωe > 0.
To summarize, the model with liquidity needs is always (for any θ) qualitatively consistent
with the risk-free rate puzzle. In addition, the model may also help to rationalize the equity-
premium puzzle–even if θ =0 –provided that measured returns, liquidity returns, and the
marginal rate of substitution covary in certain ways.
4 Quantitative analysis
I will follow the original formulation in Mehra and Prescott (1985) and let the utility over apples
and coconuts be U (c)=u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ ,w i t h0 <σ<∞. For this parametrization, q(z;κdt+1),
i.e., the quantity of coconuts traded in a meeting where the buyer can pay from a portfolio of





 κdt+1 if z ≥ g(κdt+1)
(1 +  )κdt+1 −
n
[(1 +  )κdt+1]
1−σ − (1 − σ)z
o 1
1−σ if z<g(κdt+1),




1−σ .( I f σ =1 ,t h e nq(z;κdt+1)= κdt+1 if z ≥
ln(1 + ε),a n dq(z;κdt+1)=( 1− e−z)(1+ )κdt+1 otherwise.)
16By “real value” here, I mean real value in terms of marginal utility of fruit. For example, in a period when






















16Hereafter, I specify that the government chooses the stock of bonds according to a policy rule
Bt+1 = f (dt,x t). At any date, the variables (dt,x t) are suﬃcient for predicting the subsequent
evolution of the economy. So in a recursive equilibrium (one where all equilibrium values are
invariant functions of the state), one can think of the state of the economy as being the pair
(d,i) if dt = d and xt = γi. With this convention, asset prices can be written as φs (d,i) and
φb (d,i). To guarantee that the ratio of government debt to GDP is stationary, let f (dt,x t)=
ˆ BE[dt+1|(dt,i)] if xt = γi, where ˆ B ≥ 0. Thus, given that xt = γi, Bt+1 = f (dt,x t)=Bidt,
where Bi = ˆ B
Pn
j=1 µijγj. Restricting attention to equilibria that are stationary in growth
rates amounts to focusing on equilibria where share prices are homogeneous of degree one in d,
and can therefore be written as φs(d,j)=φs
jd, where φs
j is a constant. In turn, this implies
that φb (d,i) is independent of d,s oo n ec a nw r i t eφb


















for i =1 ,...,n,w i t h
Ls
ij(φs






























































i=1 denote the vector of stationary probabilities on i,i . e . ,t h ev e c t o rt h a ts o l v e s
¯ µ = µ0¯ µ,w i t h
P
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i − 1) = ωb


















j) − 1] ˆ Rb
i − [Ls
ij(φs












j) − 1] ˆ Rb
i. (19)






¯ µiµij ˆ Rs
ij and ˆ Rb =
X
i
¯ µi ˆ Rb
i,
and the equity premium is π = ˆ Rs − ˆ Rb.
The liquidity factors (16) and (17) reﬂect the fact that the trading constraints in the bar-
gaining problem, pk ≤ a for k =1 ,2 (where k =1denotes a restricted match, and k =2
an unrestricted match), may bind in some states and not in others. Suppose that the current
realization of the growth rate is γi. Then from (16), it is clear that the set of next-period states
in which the trading constraint binds in unrestricted matches is
Ω(Bi)=
½












Hence, an economy with θ ∈ [0,1) has Ls
ij > 1 if and only if j ∈ Ω(Bi). Similarly, given that the
current period growth rate is γi, the set of next-period states in which the liquidity constraint
binds in restricted matches is
Ωθ (Bi)=
½











Naturally, Ω(Bi) ⊆ Ωθ (Bi); i.e., if the liquidity constraint binds in unrestricted trades, it also




j)=1for all i and j,
ωe = ωb =0 , and the model reduces to Mehra and Prescott (1985). The following example can
help build some intuition.
Example 1 Suppose µij = µj for all i,l e t∆ ≡ β
P
j µjγ1−σ
j < 1, γ =m a x i γi,a n dγ =











γ.T h e n ,φs
i = φs, φb
i = φb,a n dBi = B for
18all i,a n d :( a )F o rB ≥ B,w eh a v eφs = ∆
1−∆, φb = β
P
j µjγ−σ
j ,a n dΩθ = Ω = ∅;i . e . ,
Ls
j (φs)=Lb











j (φ∗).I n t h i s c a s e , Ωθ 6= ∅
and Ω 6= ∅,s oLb
j (φ∗) >L s
j (φ∗) for (at least) some j,a n dLs
i (φ∗) > 1 for (at least) some
i. To provide a full characterization, let Bθ = κ1−σ
σ−1
h













1 − (1 +  )
1−σ
i
− (1 + φ∗)
o
γ. (It is easy to see that in general, Bθ < Bθ, B < B,
B<Bθ,a n dB <B θ.) Let Ωc
θ denote the complement of Ωθ and Ωc the complement of Ω.
Then it can be shown that (i) Ωc
θ = ∅ iﬀ B<B θ,a n dΩθ = ∅ iﬀ Bθ ≤ B; and (ii) that Ωc = ∅
iﬀ B<B ,a n dΩ = ∅ iﬀ B ≤ B.
4.1 Calibration
The three basic types of parameters are those that deﬁne preferences (β and σ), those that
deﬁne technology (α,  , κ,a n dt h ee l e m e n t so f[µij] and [γi]), and ˆ B,w h i c hd e ﬁnes government
policy. In the formulations that assume diﬀerential liquidity, there is also θ, the probability
that a randomly drawn trading partner will not accept shares as a means of payment in a
decentralized exchange.17
I follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) and assume that the growth rate of the aggregate fruit
endowment follows a two-state Markov chain with γ1 =¯ γ + δ, γ2 =¯ γ − δ, µ11 = µ22 = µ,a n d
µ12 = µ21 =1− µ,a n ds e t¯ γ =1 .018, δ =0 .036,a n dµ =0 .43.18 Next, I propose a calibration
procedure for the remaining parameters. Since the main goal here is to explore the quantitative
relevance of the liquidity channel (rather than to devise a deﬁnitive calibration strategy for this
class of models), I will also consider various alternative parametrizations for the variables that
were not in Mehra and Prescott’s original analysis.
17There are also the parameters associated with the utility of general goods and the disutility of work, but
they are irrelevant for asset prices within the class of equilibria studied here. (See Section A.2 in the appendix,
in particular footnote 39, for details.)
18Mehra and Prescott selected these parameter values so that the average growth rate of per capita consump-
tion, the standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita consumption, and the ﬁrst-order serial correlation
of this growth rate (all with respect to the model’s invariant distribution) matched the sample values for the
U.S. economy between 1889 and 1978. The same is true here.
19The strategy for calibrating κ consists of selecting the value for which the fraction of GDP
that corresponds to production units (“trees”) that have outstanding tradeable equity shares in
the model matches the sample value for the U.S. economy. Since this statistic is not readily
available, I have instead guided the choice of κ by using the gross value added of the nonﬁnancial
corporate business sector as a share of GDP. In the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts
( N I P A ) ,t h i sn u m b e ri ss l i g h t l ya b o v e0.5 for the ﬁfty-seven-year period 1947—2004.19 Not all
businesses have outstanding tradeable equity, so this amounts to an upper bound. With this
in mind, I target 0.4 as a benchmark, which results in κ =0 .5.20 In the appendix, I also report
results for diﬀerent targets, both larger and smaller.
The policy parameter ˆ B determines the size of the stock of government-issued assets that can
be used as a medium of exchange, and hence the extent to which agents may experience liquidity
needs in decentralized trades. Government bonds are the only such asset in the model, but in
the United States, agents may use other government-issued assets (and claims to these assets)
to satisfy their liquidity needs. With this in mind, I constructed a new empirical monetary
aggregate, M1∗, which augments and adjusts the standard M1 measure. The measure M1∗
diﬀers from M1 in two ways. First, it includes Treasury bills in circulation. And second,
it makes an adjustment for the amounts of M1 and Treasury bills outstanding that are held
outside the United States.21 The ratio of M1∗ to annual GDP was about 0.3 in 1959, declined
19The data for Gross Value Added of Domestic Corporate Business and GDP are from NIPA, Tables 1.1.4 and
1.15, respectively.
20In the model, the fraction of GDP produced by trees that have outstanding, tradeable equity shares is
1
2+κ.
In period t, there is an endowment κdt of fruit in the ﬁrst subperiod and an endowment dt in the second, so the




−1/σ. (See Section A.2 in the appendix for details.) Multiplying this quantity by the relative price
of general goods in terms of fruit, A, yields the value of production of general goods expressed in terms of fruit,
An
∗dt. So real GDP (in terms of fruit) is (1 + κ + An
∗)dt,o rj u s t(2 + κ)dt,g i v e nA =1 .
21Data for M1 are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Money Stock Measures,
Release H.6). The amount of Treasury bills outstanding for 1959—2004 was obtained from the Bureau of the
Public Debt (Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, Table I: Summary of Treasury Securities Outstanding).
The Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States compiled by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System provides estimates of the portion of checkable deposits and currency and of Treasury securities that is
held by the rest of the world (Table L.204, line 20, and Table L.209, line 11, respectively). The series for M1 was
adjusted by assuming that the proportion that is held domestically is the same as the proportion of currency and
checkable deposits that is held domestically. Similarly, the stock of outstanding Treasury bills held domestically
was estimated by assuming that the fraction of Treasury bills held by the rest of the world is the same as the
20through 1979, hovered around 0.2 until 1995, and has been about 0.15 since then. So summing
up, this ratio has been in the interval [0.15,0.3] over the last 40 years. I use 0.3 as a benchmark
target–a conservative choice, since the magnitude of the liquidity factor is decreasing in the
value of this ratio. This choice, together with the benchmark value for κ,i m p l i e s ˆ B =0 .75.I n
the appendix, I will also report results for diﬀerent values of ˆ B.
The parameters α and   index the agent’s ability and desire to engage in bilateral exchange,
respectively. If α =0 , the economy is just a sequence of Walrasian markets, and assets are
valued only for their intrinsic payoﬀs but not for their role as media of exchange: in this case,
the model reduces to the one studied by Mehra and Prescott (1985). If   =0 , each agent has
the same endowment every ﬁrst subperiod, so there are no beneﬁts from trade in any bilateral
meeting and therefore no role for a medium of exchange. In this case, asset prices and returns
will again be just as in the economy studied by Mehra and Prescott.
T h ec h o i c eo f  has implications for consumption inequality. In the baseline calibration, I
set   =0 .8, which implies that the variance of the log of total (including general goods and
fruit in both subperiods) per capita consumption is 0.013.22 In the appendix (Section A.4), I
will also explore the implications of higher and lower values for  .N o t et h a tα =ˆ α/4, where
ˆ α is the probability that the agent ﬁnds an opportunity to trade in the decentralized market.
Is e tˆ α =1in the baseline, which basically says that every agent has a trading opportunity
in the decentralized market over the course of the year. However, only the products αθ and
α(1 − θ) matter for asset prices and returns, and I will be experimenting extensively with θ.
In the appendix (Section A.4), I verify the robustness of the main ﬁndings to changes in the
fraction of Treasury securities held by the rest of the world. The series for M1
∗ was constructed by adding the
estimated domestic holdings of Treasury bills to the estimated stock of M1 that is held domestically.
22This number is rather low relative to the values of about 0.15 that Krueger and Perri (2005) report for the
within-group (i.e., conditioning on education, age, sex, experience, occupation, region of residence) variance of the
log of per capita consumption in the United States. The cross-sectional variance of the log of total consumption
is low even for values of   close to 1. This is so because in the model, there is only inequality in consumption of
fruit in the ﬁrst subperiod, and this is only a fraction of total consumption (in addition, all agents also consume
the same amounts of fruit and general goods in the second subperiod). For the various parametrizations, I have
also computed the variance of the log of per capita consumption in the ﬁrst subperiod only–and found it to be
in line with the estimates of Krueger and Perri (2005).
21values of ˆ B, κ,a n dε, the parameters that were not in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The nature of Mehra and Prescott’s test of the theory was to experiment with diﬀerent
values of β and σ to ﬁnd the combinations of these parameters for which the model’s average
risk-free rate and equity premium matched those observed for the U.S. economy. (Table 1,
taken from Mehra and Prescott (2003), reports the basic facts according to various data sets.)
In the next section I will carry out a similar exercise, except that I will not experiment with β,
which is set to 0.99 throughout. I will ﬁrst consider the economy with no exogenous liquidity
diﬀerences between equity shares and bonds, and assess the model’s ability to produce bond
returns and equity premia that resemble those observed for the U.S. economy. I will then go on
to consider the speciﬁcation with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences where shares are not accepted
as a means of payment in a fraction θ of decentralized exchanges. For this speciﬁcation, the
question I pose is: how large does θ (the relative illiquidity of equity) need to be for the model
to generate an average risk-free rate of 1% and an average equity premium that matches the
one observed in the U.S. economy?
Data Set % Real Return % Real Return on a % Equity Premium
on a Market Relatively Riskless (Mean)
Index (Mean) Security (Mean)
1889—1978 (Mehra—Prescott, 1985) 6.98 0.80 6.18
1889—2000 (Mehra—Prescott, 2003) 8.06 1.14 6.92
1926—2000 (Ibbotson Associates, 2001) 8.80 0.40 8.40
1871—1999 (Shiller, 1990) 6.99 1.74 5.25
1802—1998 (Siegel, 1998) 7.00 2.90 4.10
Table 1: U.S. equity premium from diﬀerent data sets
4.2 Results
Table 2 reports the average percentage return on equity, the average percentage return on the
bond, and their diﬀerence (the equity premium) in the Mehra—Prescott economy for values
of σ ranging from 1 to 10. For these “reasonable” values of σ, the risk-free rate is too high
and the equity premium too low. Table 3 corresponds to the benchmark calibration of the
22basic model augmented to allow for a liquidity motive, as outlined in the previous sections.
(Table 3 assumes θ =0 , i.e., no exogenous liquidity diﬀerences between equity and bonds.)
T h el a s tc o l u m no fe a c ho ft h e s et a b l e sr e p o r t st h ep a i ro fw e d g e s(ωe,ωb) to the agent’s Euler
equations (see (18) and (19)). These wedges are zero if agents have enough liquidity to conduct











1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 0,0
4 7.89 7.18 0.71 0,0
5 9.42 8.45 0.97 0,0
6 10.88 9.62 1.26 0,0
7 12.24 10.67 1.57 0,0
8 13.52 11.60 1.92 0,0
9 14.70 12.41 2.29 0,0
10 15.79 13.10 2.69 0,0










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 0,0
4 7.89 7.18 0.71 0,0
5 9.42 8.45 0.97 0,0
6 10.88 9.62 1.26 0,0
7 12.24 10.67 1.57 0,0
8 8.80 6.76 2.04 .0010,-.0435
9 5.97 3.54 2.43 .0014,-.0790
10 4.35 1.50 2.85 .0017,-.1027
Table 3: Benchmark economy with θ =0
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the ﬁrst seven rows in Table 3 are identical to the corresponding
rows in Table 2: the economy behaves exactly as the Mehra—Prescott economy up to σ =7 .B y
23the time σ reaches 8, equilibrium asset prices and returns begin to diﬀer across both economies.
For example, in Table 2, when the curvature parameter goes from 7 to 8, the return on equity
rises from 12.24% to 13.52%, and the bond return rises from 10.67% to 11.6%. In contrast,
in the economy of Table 3, the equity and bond returns fall from 12.24% to 8.8%, and from
10.67% to 6.76%, respectively. The two economies behave diﬀerently for higher values of σ
because agents face binding liquidity constraints in bilateral trades for high values of σ,b u tn o t
for low values.
To see why this is the case, let Ω(Bi) denote the set of states for which the liquidity
constraints bind in the economy with θ =0 , in a period when the outstanding stock of bonds
is Bi
γj d. From the analysis in the previous sections, we know that
Ω(Bi)=
½














γj )d is the real (value in terms of fruit of the) equilibrium portfolio at the
beginning of the ﬁrst subperiod when the state is (d,j) and the outstanding stock of bonds is
Bi
γj d, and hence (1 +φs
j + Bi
γj )d1−σ is the “price” of this portfolio in terms of marginal utility of
fruit. The deﬁnition of the set Ω(Bi) states that the buyer’s liquidity constraint binds if this
value of her portfolio falls short of u[(1 +  )κd]−u(κd)=κ1−σ
σ−1 [1−(1 +  )
1−σ]d1−σ,n a m e l y ,t h e
amount of utility she has to transfer to the seller for him to be willing to consume κd instead
of (1 +  )κd in the ﬁrst subperiod. In the benchmark parametrization, it can be shown that
κ1−σ
σ−1 [1−(1 +  )
1−σ] is strictly increasing in σ. This means that, keeping φs
j constant, the set Ω
is nondecreasing in σ. Of course, in the general equilibrium σ also aﬀects equity prices φs
j,b u t
for the baseline parametrization, the direct eﬀect that tends to tighten the liquidity constraint
quantitatively dominates the indirect eﬀect that operates through the price of equity (which in
general tends to loosen the liquidity constraint, since equity prices typically rise with σ when
the liquidity constraints are not always slack).
To be more precise, for the economy reported in Table 3, there is a σh ≈ 7.153 such that
for all i ∈ {1,2},w eh a v eΩ(Bi)=∅ for σ ≤ σh and Ω(Bi)={1,2} for σ>σ h. That is, for
24σ>σ h, buyers in the decentralized market face binding liquidity constraints for all realizations
of the aggregate endowment process and every outstanding stock of bonds implied by the
government’s policy rule. When liquidity constraints bind, assets help relax those constraints,
and this additional “liquidity service” they provide is reﬂected in asset prices and their measured
returns–the asset returns as they are conventionally measured. When the liquidity constraints
bind, asset prices rise, and their measured, intrinsic returns fall with σ. The reason is that
the liquidity constraint becomes progressively tighter with larger values of σ,s oa g e n t sh a v e
an additional incentive to hold assets: they help relax liquidity constraints. This means that–
relative to a world with no liquidity–investors no longer require such large expected measured
returns to be willing to hold those assets. (Conversely, in the Mehra—Prescott economy of Table
2, asset prices are strictly decreasing and returns strictly increasing in σ, at least for reasonable
values, e.g., σ ≤ 20.)
If we compare the third columns of Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that, for σ>σ h,t h ee q u i t y
premium is only slightly higher in the model with liquidity and θ =0 ,r e l a t i v et ot h eM e h r a —
Prescott economy. Take the row corresponding to σ =1 0 , for instance: the standard model
generates a premium of 2.69% and the model with liquidity a premium of 2.85%. The big
diﬀerence is in the actual asset returns that compose this premium. In the standard model the
2.69% is the diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e na ne q u i t yr e t u r no f1 5 . 7 9 %a n dar i s k - f r e er a t eo f1 3 . 1 0 % – b o t h
much too high relative to the values reported in Table 1. In contrast, the 2.85% premium in
the model with liquidity is the diﬀerence between an equity return of 4.35% and a risk-free rate
of 1.5%. The former is rather low, but the latter is within the range of estimates reported in
Table 1. All this is illustrated in Figure 1.
The last column of Tables 2 and 3 reports the “wedges” to the Euler equations deﬁned in
(18) and (19). This column can be used as an indicator of when the liquidity constraints bind
a n dw h e nt h e yd on o t .I nT a b l e3 ,f o rσ ≤ σh, i.e., when these constraints are slack in all states,
both wedges equal zero, and the equilibrium asset prices and returns coincide with those in the
Mehra—Prescott economy. For σ>σ h the liquidity constraints bind, so these wedges become
25Figure 1: Returns for Mehra—Prescott and for the economy with liquidity (θ =0 )




j), and therefore (see (18)) the
wedge −ωe is a weighted average of ( ˆ Rs
ij − ˆ Rb
i), the state-by-state equity premium. Since the
average equity premium is modest and the “weight” βγ−σ
j Lij is large in the low-growth state,
when ( ˆ Rs
ij − ˆ Rb
i) < 0, and small in the high-growth state, when ( ˆ Rs
ij − ˆ Rb
i) > 0, the model
delivers ωe > 0.23 The wedge −ωb is a weighted average of the risk-free rate, ˆ Rb
i,s ow eh a v e
ωb < 0 (see (19)).
As mentioned in Section 3, a large body of empirical work in asset pricing speciﬁes and tests
the sample counterpart to the moment restriction implied by the Euler equation of candidate
structural models (e.g., Hansen and Singleton (1982)). The wedges ωe and ωb in the last column
of Table 3 can be thought of as the theoretical counterparts of the sample means reported in
Kocherlakota (1996) (Tables 2 and 3, pp. 50—51). Interestingly, even with θ =0 , the model is
able to replicate the signs of these wedges. Quantitatively, however, ωe is too small relative to
23For σ =1 0 , for example, ˆ R
b
1 =0 .96, ˆ R
b
2 =1 .07, ˆ R
s
11 =1 .076, ˆ R
s
21 =1 .169, ˆ R
s
12 =0 .92,a n dˆ R
s
22 =1 .
Note that ˆ R
s
i1 − ˆ R
b
i > 0 and ˆ R
s
i2 − ˆ R
b
i < 0 for i =1 ,2. The liquidity factors are L11 =1 .0726, L21 =1 .0725,
L12 =1 .1355,a n dL22 =1 .1353.
26the sample means that Kocherlakota reports in his Table 2.24 Conversely, the value of ωb for σ
ranging from 7 to 10 is roughly in line with magnitudes of the sample means that Kocherlakota
r e p o r t si nh i sT a b l e3 – a ni n d i c a t i o nt h a t ,e v e nw i t hθ =0 , the model is able to rationalize the
r i s k - f r e er a t ep u z z l e .
The risk-free rate remains low for high risk aversion because assets, and in particular bonds,
yield a liquidity return which agents take into account when choosing their portfolios, but
ﬁnancial analysts don’t include in their calculations of actual measured returns. In the usual
Mehra—Prescott economy, the risk-free rate puzzle arises because at relatively high levels of σ,
the equilibrium must oﬀer agents in a growing economy a high return on bonds for them to be
willing to hold them. From the optic of the model with liquidity needs, at higher levels of σ the
equilibrium compensates agents for holding bonds (and since θ =0 , equity) with a high overall
return composed of a relatively high liquidity return and a relatively low “measured” return of
about 1.5%.
Now consider the more general formulation with liquidity diﬀerences between bonds and
equity indexed by an arbitrary θ ∈ [0,1]. Figure 2 reports the asset returns and equity premia
corresponding to various economies indexed by θ and σ,w i t hθ ranging from 0 to 3%,a n dσ
ranging from 1 to 5.S p e c i ﬁcally, the ﬁgure depicts the “level sets” for the theoretical average
equity returns, bond returns, and equity premia. The ﬁrst panel, for instance, shows the various
θ—σ combinations that generate a given average equity return. Equity returns are independent
of θ, so the level sets are ﬂat lines. For example, if σ is slightly above 4 (if σ =4 .072,t o
24For σ ranging from 7 to 10, the magnitude of the ω
e wedge generated by the model is relatively close to
some of the mean values one obtains from data sets other than the one used by Kocherlakota (1996). See Table
3i n˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2003), for example. There, he compares estimates of the wedges for two measures of the “risk-
free” rate, the usual one based on 90-day Treasury bills, and another based on high-grade long-term corporate
bonds; and for two measures of equity returns, the standard one based on S&P 500, and another based on
S&P 500 but subject to the adjustments suggested by McGrattan and Prescott (2001, 2003). Their adjustments
are intended to account for taxes, regulatory constraints, and diversiﬁcation costs. McGrattan and Prescott’s
emphasis on deﬁning the equity premium relative to long-term bonds–as opposed to relative to 90-day Treasury
bills–seems to be an attempt to control for possible liquidity premia: “One problem [with Mehra and Prescott’s
analysis] is interpreting the return on a 90-day T-bill as the rate at which households intertemporally substitute
consumption. We do not interpret it as such. Treasury bills provide considerable liquidity services and are a
negligible part of individuals’ long-term debt holdings” (McGrattan and Prescott (2003), p. 393).
27be precise), the model economy generates an average equity return of 8% for any value of θ.
S i m i l a r l y ,t h el e v e ls e t si nt h em i d d l ep a n e ls h o wt h ev a r i o u sθ—σ combinations that generate
a given average bond return. Notice that even for this relatively narrow parameter range
(0 ≤ θ ≤ 0.03 and 1 ≤ σ ≤ 5), the model can display a wide range of bond returns, as high as
5% and as low as −10%. For example, if σ =4 , the equilibrium average bond return would be
1% if θ =0 .0222. The last panel shows the average equity premium generated by the model
for each θ—σ combination. For a given value of σ, the equity premium is increasing in θ,a n di n
f a c t ,i ti sm o r er e s p o n s i v et oθ for larger values of σ.
Figure 2: Economies with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
I can now address one of the questions posed in the introduction: for any given view on the
value that σ should take, how large does θ (the relative assumed “illiquidity” of equity) have
to be for the model to generate an average risk-free rate of 1% and an average equity premium
that matches the long-term average for the U.S. economy? The answer is Table 4.
Table 4 was generated with the baseline parametrization used to generate Table 3. The
diﬀerence is that in Table 4, for each value of σ, the parameter θ was chosen so that the risk-
free rate is equal to 1%, whenever possible. (The middle panel of Figure 2 gives a clear idea of
how this can be done.) The resulting value of θ, denoted θ∗, is reported in the last column.










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0 –
2 4.58 1 3.58 .0316,-.0316 .3799
3 6.27 1 5.27 .0453,-.0453 .0742
4 7.89 1 6.89 .0576,-.0576 .0222
5 9.42 1 8.42 .0687,-.0687 .062×10−1
6 10.88 1 9.88 .0786,-.0786 .015×10−1
7 12.24 1 11.24 .0873,-.0873 .032×10−2
8 8.80 1 7.80 .0526,-.0950 3.40×10−5
9 5.97 1 4.97 .0240,-.1016 2.45×10−6
10 4.35 1 3.35 .0062,-.1072 7.26×10−8
Table 4: Benchmark economy with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
former there are two types of decentralized trades: some where agents can pay using bonds and
equity, and a fraction θ where they can use only bonds. This means that in any given state
of the world, agents may face binding liquidity constraints in all decentralized trades, just in
those where only bonds can be used as a medium of exchange, or in none of the decentralized
trades. Formally, in addition to the set Ω(·) deﬁned in (20), there is now another set,
Ωθ (Bi)=
½











that contains the states for which the liquidity constraints are binding in meetings where only
bonds can be used in exchange when the outstanding stock of bonds is Bi
γj d.
The ﬁrst row of Table 4 is identical to the ﬁrst row of Table 3 (and of Table 2). That is,
if σ =1 , the agents’ liquidity needs are so modest that the value of their equilibrium bond
holdings is large enough to allow them to buy the ﬁrst-best quantity  κdt in every round of
decentralized trade, for all realizations of the dividend process. Formally, Ωθ (Bi)=∅ for all i
and Ω(Bi)=∅,s i n c eΩ(Bi) ⊆ Ωθ (Bi). Thus, the equilibrium is independent of the value of θ.
For σ =2 , agents’ liquidity needs are already strong enough so that the liquidity constraint
is no longer slack in all decentralized meetings. (The nonzero wedges indicate the agent is
sometimes short of liquidity.) In fact, for the benchmark parametrization, the equilibrium has
Ωθ (Bi)={1,2} for all i. That is, for all realizations of the aggregate endowment process
29and every outstanding stock of bonds implied by the government’s policy rule, the liquidity
constraint binds in decentralized trades where the buyer can use only bonds. With σ =2
liquidity constraints do not bind in decentralized trades where both equity shares and bonds can
be used as means of payment, i.e., Ω(Bi)=∅ for all i. The equilibrium remains qualitatively
t h es a m e( i nt h es e n s et h a tΩ(Bi)=∅ and Ωθ (Bi)={1,2} for all i)u pt oσ = σh.F o rσ>σ h,
the liquidity motive becomes so strong that the equilibrium has Ωθ (Bi)=Ω(Bi)={1,2} for
all i; that is, liquidity constraints bind at all dates, in all decentralized trades–even when
agents can pay with bond and equity shares.25
Figure 3 illustrates and complements the ﬁndings summarized in Table 4. For each value
of σ ranging from 1 to 10, the dashed line gives the corresponding value of θ∗,w h i c hc a nb e
read oﬀ the left vertical axis. As mentioned while discussing the ﬁrst row of Table 4, there is a
σm ≈ 1.760 such that there is no θ ≤ 1 that can make the bond return 1% for σ<σ m.T h u s ,
the ﬁrst point on the dashed line is (σm,θ ∗) with θ∗ =1 . As we increase σ away from σm,t h e
implied θ∗ falls rapidly for relatively small values of σ,e . g . ,u pt oσ =5 , and levels oﬀ–at very
low values–for larger σ.
For each value of σ, the solid line in Figure 3 displays the equity premium generated by the
model with θ = θ∗. (The percentage equity premium can be read oﬀ the right vertical axis.)
For values of σ between 1 and σl ≈ 1.695 <σ m, the liquidity needs are so mild that the bond
portfolio alone is enough to satisfy them. This is the range at which Ω(Bi)=Ωθ (Bi)=∅,s o
neither bonds nor equity yields a liquidity return. The equilibrium is independent of θ,a n dt h e
equity premium increases slightly with σ just as in Mehra—Prescott. The ﬁrst kink (the one
at σl) occurs because for σ>σ l, the liquidity constraint starts to bind in restricted matches.
However, even though bonds yield a liquidity return, it is too small to lower the measured
return to 1%,e v e ni fθ =1 .T h a t i s , e v e n w i t h θ =1 , the measured bond return is above
1% for σ<σ m. The second kink (the one at σ = σm) indicates that from then on (i.e., to
25Again, notice that the column that reports the Euler equation “wedges” ω
e and ω
b c a nb eu s e da sa ni n d i c a t o r
of the binding patterns of the liquidity constraints. To see this, refer back to (18) and (19) and note that: (i)
ω
e = ω
b =0if Ωθ (Bi)=Ω(Bi)=∅,( ii) ω






30Figure 3: The equity premium in economies with liquidity diﬀerences
the right of σm), θ can and is chosen to peg the bond return at 1%.F o rv a l u e so fσ between
σm and σh, the implied equilibrium has Ωθ (Bi)={1,2} and Ω(Bi)=∅ for all i. The equity
premium peaks at 11.45%, corresponding to an economy with σ = σh and θ∗ ≈ 4.21×10−5.T h e
third kink (the one at σh) occurs because for parametrizations with σ larger than σh, liquidity
needs are so severe that agents are constrained in all trades, restricted and unrestricted, i.e.,
Ω(Bi)=Ωθ (Bi)={1,2} for all i.
Notice that equity returns are identical across Tables 3 and 4, as is to be expected from the
results in the ﬁrst panel of Figure 2. Thus, just as for the economy with θ =0 , equity returns
coincide with those of the Mehra—Prescott economy for σ ≤ σh. Although equity shares can
in principle provide liquidity in the economies of Tables 3 and 4, they don’t for relatively low
levels of σ. Accordingly, for this range of σ, equity returns are increasing in σ.26 Interestingly,
26Just as in Table 3, equity returns start falling for σ above σh, once equity shares can be used to relax liquidity
constraints at the margin, i.e., once liquidity constraints start binding in decentralized trades where agents can
31the equilibrium equity returns and the equity premium implied by σ =3 , σ =4 ,a n dσ =5in
Table 4 lie within the range of estimates reported in Table 1.27 The corresponding values of θ∗
are 0.0742, 0.0222,a n d0.0062, respectively. So, for example, if σ =4 ,t h i ss a y st h a ti n2 out
of 100 decentralized trading opportunities, agents ﬁnd themselves in a situation in which they
cannot trade away the shares in their portfolios. At face value, this proportion seems rather
small, especially given that the institutional arrangements for trading away equity and bonds
are rather diﬀerent in actual economies.28 But this view may leave room for dissent, so in the
following section, I propose a more systematic way to gauge the absolute size of the diﬀerence
in the relative ability of shares and bonds to serve as mediums of exchange, which are needed
for the liquidity motive to be able to rationalize the full observed equity premium.29
The signs and magnitudes of the Euler equation wedges in Table 4 are in line with those
estimated by Kocherlakota (1996) using Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) data. For example, if
σ =5 , (ωe,ωb)=( .0687,−.0687), compared to (.0433,−.0675) in Kocherlakota’s Tables 2 and
3. For σ =4 , the model implies (ωe,ωb)=( .0576,−.0576), and Kocherlakota’s estimates are
(.0464,−.0569),a n df o rσ =3 , (ωe,ωb)=( .0453,−.0453), compared to (.0496,−.0448).30
To see the eﬀects that liquidity diﬀerences among assets have on equilibrium returns, con-
sider Figure 4, which is analogous to Figure 1, but with θ =0 .0222 (the θ∗ corresponding to
σ =4in Table 4). The only diﬀerence between the ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 and the ﬁrst panel of
pay with any combination of shares and bonds.
27Note that although the equity return (and consequently also the equity premium) is too high for σ =6and
7, the equity return and the equity premium are also in line with the data for σ =8 . Liquidity constraints bind
in all trades for σ ≥ σh, so in this range equity yields a liquidity return, and this depresses the measured intrinsic
return back to a level consistent with some of the estimates in Table 1.
28Here I have in mind the fact that from an investor’s standpoint, executing and settling a sale of shares
routinely takes longer than executing and settling a sale of bonds (see footnote 8). These diﬀerences may imply
that once in a while, the proceeds of a sale of equity shares may not be available in time to take advantage of a
ﬂeeting trade opportunity.
29Lest there be any confusion, I want to stress that these exercises are not meant to suggest that only liquidity
considerations are behind the observed equity premium. The spirit is rather to put this liquidity mechanism to
an extreme test by asking whether it could conceivably account for the whole premium. To the extent that these
sorts of liquidity considerations are only one of several ingredients of a broader theory of the equity premium,
the implied values of θ
∗ will be even smaller.
30For σ =8 , the other parametrization that can generate reasonable average equity return and premium, the
model has (ω
e,ω
b)=( .0526,−.0950), and Kocherlakota reports (.0341,−.0910).
32Figure 4 is the dashed line, i.e., the measured bond return, which is much lower in the latter.
The most noteworthy feature of the second panel of Figure 4 is the sheer size of the equity
premium in an economy with only modest liquidity diﬀerences. (Note that the vertical axis
here goes from 0 to 7% but only up to 3% in the second panel of Figure 1.) For example, the
equity premium is 7% if σ ≈ 4.0125.
Figure 4: Returns for Mehra—Prescott and for the economy with liquidity (θ =0 .0222)
The focus of the paper is on the ﬁrst moments of asset returns, but I conclude this section
with a remark on second moments. The standard deviations of equity returns in the model with
liquidity (for any value of θ)d on o td i ﬀer much from the Mehra—Prescott model. For example,
they are 3.6% for σ =1 , 6.2% for σ =5 ,a n d9.6% for σ =1 0 . (The standard deviations are
identical to the Mehra—Prescott counterparts up to σ = σh and vary only slightly for higher
values of σ.) Even though these standard deviations are rather low (the standard deviation
is roughly 16% in the data), the Mehra—Prescott model still generates a Sharpe ratio that is
too low (0.035 for σ =1 , 0.156 for σ =5 ,a n d0.276 for σ =1 0 ) relative to the standard
estimates (about 0.5). Interestingly, the Sharpe ratio is too high in the model with liquidity
33for the parametrizations that generate the right premium. Of course, this is just another way
of saying that the liquidity mechanism, as modeled here, does not induce additional volatility
in equity returns.
4.3 Bond—equity trade-volume bounds
A natural way to assess whether the values of θ that are needed for the model to rationalize
the equity premium as a liquidity premium are “reasonable” follows from the realization that
θ determines the frequency with which bonds get traded vis-à-vis shares. For example, in
the extreme case with θ =1 , equity shares never change hands in this economy: each agent
holds a single equity share at the end of the period, and since these shares are never used in
decentralized trades, each agent also enters every second subperiod with the same share, so no
shares are traded along the equilibrium. Conversely, in this case the volume of bonds traded
will be positive along the equilibrium path, since at least some bonds will be exchanged in the
ﬁrst subperiod and again in the second subperiod. The idea, then, is to construct the ratio of
t h ev a l u eo fb o n d st r a d e di nag i v e np e r i o d( a sap r o p o r t i o no ft h et o t a lv a l u eo fo u t s t a n d i n g




ij denote the quantities or volumes of bonds and equity shares that are traded
in a period when the aggregate state is (d,j) and the outstanding stock of bonds is Bi




ij are, respectively, the value of bonds and shares that change hands during the
period, expressed in terms of fruit, the numeraire. The total values of outstanding bonds and
s h a r e si nt h es a m ep e r i o da r eBi
γj d and φs
jd. The proportion of the outstanding value of the
stock of bonds traded during the period–the bond turnover ratio–is vb
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can be used as a measure of the turnover of bonds relative to the turnover of equity.
34The total volumes traded are vb
ij = ˆ α
2[θpb
ij +( 1− θ)ˆ pb
ij],a n dvs
ij =ˆ α(1 − θ)ˆ ps
ij, where pb
ij
is the quantity of bonds traded in a match where shares cannot be used, and (ˆ ps
ij, ˆ pb
ij) is the
portfolio that changes hands in a match where both shares and bonds can be used for payment,
in a period when the aggregate state is (d,j) and the outstanding stock of bonds is Bi
γj d.( C l e a r l y ,
as mentioned earlier, vs
ij → 0 as θ → 1,s ov a l u e so fθ close to 1 are unreasonable in that they
would imply an unrealistically large volume of trade for bonds relative to shares.)
To get a sense for how the quantities pb
ij, ˆ ps
ij,a n dˆ pb
ij of assets traded in the decentralized
market are determined, it is convenient to consider the four possible types of double-coincidence
trades a buyer may ﬁnd himself in when θ ∈ (0,1). The buyer may be in a meeting where he
can use shares as means of payment, or where he cannot, and in each case, the relevant liquidity
constraint may be binding or slack. In the two cases where the relevant constraint is binding,
the agent simply spends all his portfolio if the meeting is one in which both can be used in
exchange, or just all his bond holdings if the meeting is one in which shares cannot be traded.
If the liquidity constraint is slack in a meeting where only bonds can be used in exchange (for
example, as is the case when σ =1 ), he will spend just enough bonds to aﬀord  κd. However,
if the liquidity constraint is slack in trades where either asset can be used as a medium of
exchange, then only the real value of the portfolio that changes hands is pinned down by the
equilibrium–the precise composition of the portfolio that the buyer gives the seller in exchange
for the  κd quantity of fruit is indeterminate.31
This means that in those cases where the liquidity constraint is slack in trades where either
asset can be used in exchange (as is the case for σ =2through 7 in the benchmark parame-
t r i z a t i o no ft h em o d e lw i t hθ ∈ (0,1)), the precise trading volumes of bonds and shares are
indeterminate in the equilibrium. Nonetheless, for each value of θ, it is possible to derive im-
plied upper and lower bounds for υij,d e n o t e dυij and υij, respectively. From these, I derive the
average (with respect to the model’s invariant distribution) upper and lower bounds, υ and υ
for the ratio of the value of traded bonds (as a proportion of the value of the outstanding stock
31For details, see the discussion around (27) in the appendix (Section A.3).
35of bonds) to the value of traded shares (as a proportion of the value of outstanding equity).
(See the appendix for details.) Values of θ that imply bounds υ and υ such that the ratio of
bond to equity trade volumes computed from actual data is smaller than υ would be deemed
too large. Similarly, values of θ for which the value of the ratio observed in the data is larger
than the implied υ would be too low.
From Table 4, the values of σ for which the model is able to generate a risk-free rate of 1%
and an equity premium that is in line with the data are σ =3 , 4,a n d5.F o rσ =5 , θ =0 .0062,
and this value of θ implies [υ,υ]=[ .01,2.55]. This means that the model is consistent with the
value of traded bonds (relative to the value of outstanding bonds) being at most two and a half
times and at least 1% of the value of traded equity (relative to the value of outstanding equity).
Similarly, the volume bounds implied by θ =0 .0222 (the value corresponding to σ =4 )a r e
[.09,6.29],a n dt h o s ei m p l i e db yθ =0 .0742 (the value corresponding to σ =3 )a r e[0.7,20].T h e
bound for the pair (σ,θ)=( 6 ,.0015) is [.0015,1.17]. Naturally, υ is increasing in θ (decreasing
in σ).
5 Discussion
The bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) provide a way of assessing the magnitude of
asset-pricing puzzles and are often used as diagnostics tests for asset-pricing models. I begin
by asking how the Mehra—Prescott economy and the benchmark economy with liquidity fare
against these bounds for diﬀerent values of σ. T h i si sau s e f u lw a yt ou n d e r s t a n dh o wt h e
two models diﬀer at the core, i.e., in terms of the ﬁrst and second moments of their respective
stochastic discount factors.
Let m denote a stochastic discount factor that satisﬁes E (mR)=1, the unconditional
version of the agent’s Euler equations, where R =[ R1,R 2]0 and 1 i sav e c t o ro fo n e s .L e tΣm
denote the standard deviation of m. The cup-shaped line in Figure 5 is the Hansen—Jagannathan
bound for returns; i.e., Σm ≥ [b0cov (R,R)b]
1/2,w i t hb =[ cov (R,R)]
−1 [1 − E (m)E (R)].T h e
straight line is the Hansen—Jagannathan bound on excess returns; i.e., Σm ≥ [b0cov (z,z)b]
1/2,
36with b = −[cov (z,z)]
−1 E (m)E (z) and z = R1 − R2.32 The lines are drawn for the orig-
inal Mehra—Prescott data: R0 =[ 1 .07,1.01], var(R1)=0 .0274, var(R2)=0 .00308,a n d
cov(R1,R 2)=0 .00104. According to these data, the minimum standard deviation an admissi-
ble stochastic discount factor must have is about 0.3509 (the minimum height of the cup-shaped
curve). This value of Σm corresponds to an E (m) of about 0.9855. Since the sides of the cup
are rather steep, a model that satisﬁes this bound must have a stochastic discount factor with
am e a nt h a ti sc l o s et o0.9855, unless one is willing to accept a dramatically higher standard
deviation for the stochastic discount factor. (If agents have access to a risk-free return, then
this value of E (m) implies a risk-free rate close to 1.0147.)
Figure 5: Hansen—Jagannathan bounds
32See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for a textbook treatment. The bounds in Figure 1 are identical to those
in Ljungqvist and Sargent’s Figure 10.4, p. 287. McGrattan and Prescott (2003) suggest some adjustments to
the basic data that result in a diﬀerent–lower–pair of bounds. See ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2003) for details.
37Consider the basic model with no exogenous liquidity diﬀerences between assets. The Euler
equations (14) and (15) imply:
P
j µijmij ˆ Rs
ij =
P
j µijmij ˆ Rb
i =1 , where Lij = Ls
ij (as given
in (16), with θ =0 )a n dmij = βγ−σ
j Lij is the stochastic discount factor between states i
and j. The circles in Figure 5 give the mean—standard deviation pairs of this discount factor
implied by the benchmark calibration of Table 3, for values of σ ranging from 1 to 10.T h e
crosses are the analogous mean—standard deviation pairs obtained by setting Lij =1for all i
and j. In this case, the stochastic discount factor for state j is just mj = βγ−σ
j :t h i si st h e
basic Mehra—Prescott economy of Table 2. For example, if σ =1 , the mean—standard deviation
pair is (0.9737,0.0346) f o rb o t hm o d e l s . T h i si st h el o w e s tp o i n ti nt h eﬁgure; higher points
correspond to higher values of σ.I n f a c t , f o r σ =1through 7, the liquidity constraints are
slack (recall that the Euler equation wedges are zero in Table 3), so both models share the
same stochastic discount factor, and hence they generate the same mean—standard deviation
pair for each σ. (These seven points appear marked with a circle and a cross in Figure 5.)
The stochastic discount factors of the two models diverge for σ =8and higher, i.e., once the
liquidity constraints start to bind. The liquidity mechanism increases the standard deviation,
but especially the mean of the stochastic discount factor. For instance, at σ =1 0 , the model
with liquidity has a stochastic discount factor with mean and standard deviation (0.9878,0.3602)
just inside the admissible cup-shaped area.33
I would like to stress that this discussion is not intended to suggest that the model developed
here solves the equity premium puzzle because the point corresponding to σ =1 0lies inside the
cup-shaped area. Instead, the spirit is that, by understanding how the new ingredients I have
added to the standard Lucas-type asset-pricing model (e.g., decentralized exchange, anonymity,
and the resulting need for a medium of exchange) aﬀect the moments of the stochastic discount
factor that prices returns, one can get a better sense for why these ingredients can enhance the
ability of the model to explain asset returns.
33For σ =1 0 , the Mehra—Prescott economy implies (0.8861,0.3010), which does not even satisfy the bound for
excess returns. It takes a value of σ of about 20 in the Mehra—Prescott model to bring the mean and standard
deviation of their stochastic discount factor within the bounds implied by their data.
38Next, consider the more general formulation with θ ∈ [0,1]. The (unconditional versions of
the) corresponding Euler equations (2) and (3) imply the following expression for the average
risk premium:






− cov( ˆ Rs,L s)+cov( ˆ Rb,L b)
+[E(Lb) − 1]E( ˆ Rb) − [E(Ls) − 1]E( ˆ Rs), (22)
where MRSt+1 denotes the marginal rate of substitution, βU0 (ct+1)/U0 (ct).( R e c a l lt h a tˆ Ri
t+1
is the measured return of asset i,a n dRi
t+1 = Li
t+1 ˆ Ri
t+1 is the full return, as perceived by the
agents in the model.) The ﬁrst two terms are standard: excess returns are partly due to the
fact that the full return on equity covaries with the growth rate of consumption more than
does the average bond return. The third term is an adjustment for the degree to which equity
returns covary with the liquidity constraints; i.e., it reﬂects the extent to which equity shares
are a good hedge against binding liquidity constraints. For example, if the liquidity constraints
that can be relaxed with shares are looser in periods when the equity return is relatively high,
then cov( ˆ Rs,L s) < 0, and the third term tends to magnify the measured equity premium. The
fourth term is an analogous adjustment for bonds. The last two terms reﬂect the liquidity
return diﬀerential between the assets: their sum will be positive if lnE(Lb) − lnE(Ls) >
lnE( ˆ Rs) − lnE( ˆ Rb), namely, if the average (geometric) excess liquidity return of bonds over
shares is larger than the average (geometric) excess measured return of shares over bonds.
When this is the case, the combination of the last two terms adds on to the equity premium as
it is typically measured.34
To get some intuition about the signs and relative magnitudes of the various components of





t =1with probability 1 at all t, as is the case for the benchmark parametrization with θ =0for












and the model relies only on the ﬁrst two terms discussed above to account for the whole equity premium.
39Mean Variance-Covariance
ˆ Rs ˆ Rb Ls Lb Rs Rb MRS
ˆ Rs 1.043518 .00914 .00282 -.00268 -.00268 .00728 .00039 -.02569
ˆ Rb 1.015041 .00269 -.00023 -.00023 .00287 .00274 -.00219
Ls 1.103996 .00099 .00099 -.00193 .00075 .00946
Lb 1.103996 .00099 -.00193 .00075 .00946
Rs 1.149354 .00601 .00121 -.01849
Rb 1.120370 .00378 .00719
MRS 0.886144 .09063
Table 5: Moments of returns, baseline with σ =1 0and θ =0
Mean Variance-Covariance
ˆ Rs ˆ Rb Ls Lb Rs Rb MRS
ˆ Rs 1.078871 .00305 .00042 0 .00028 .00305 .00074 -.00701
ˆ Rb 1.01 .00039 0 -2.8×10−8 .00042 .00042 -.00036
Ls 1.00 00 0 0 0
Lb 1.061942 .00003 .00028 .00003 -.00073
Rs 1.078871 .00305 .00074 -.00701
Rb 1.072561 .00048 -.00112
MRS 0.933394 .01722
Table 6: Moments of returns, baseline with σ =4and θ =0 .0222
liquidity premia, and marginal rate of substitution implied by the model. Table 5 corresponds
to the baseline economy, but with θ =0and σ =1 0(the tenth line of Table 3). In this case,
we know that there is no liquidity diﬀerential, i.e., Lb = Ls = L always, so the premium can be
written as























The numbers below each term are for the decomposition implied by the model. The ﬁrst
two terms account for about 92% of the premium and the third for 8.5%. In this case, since
cov(L,MRS) > 0, the liquidity mechanism is causing the total return on equity, Rs,t oc o v a r y
more with the MRS than the measured return ˆ Rs, and this tends to bring the equity premium
down from what it would have been in an economy with L =1 .35 However, the fact that
35For Mehra—Prescott, in this parametrization the premium is 0.02689, and it is accounted for fully by the




positive even though cov( ˆ Rb,MRS) < 0 (see Table 5).
Intuitively, the measured asset returns ˆ Rs and ˆ Rb tend to be high in times when the growth
rate of consumption is high (the MRS low), but these are also times when the value of the
average portfolio is high, which means that each agent will face looser liquidity constraints, or
equivalently, that L will tend to be low in those periods.
Table 6 corresponds to the baseline economy, with σ =4and θ =0 .0222 (the fourth row of
Table 4). In this case Ls =1always, so the third and ﬁfth terms of (22) are identically zero,
and the premium can be decomposed as
E( ˆ Rs − ˆ Rb)
| {z }
.068871








The liquidity diﬀerential between bonds and equity accounts for about 90% of the equity pre-
mium.36 In yet another way to try to assess which fraction of the equity premium is due to risk
and which to liquidity considerations, I have set δ (the standard deviation of the growth rate
of the endowment) to zero in the baseline. For example, with σ =4and θ =0 .0222 (see Tables
4 and 6), the equity premium goes down from 6.8871% to 6.3146%. So in this case, about 90%
of the equity premium is due to the fact that equity pays an illiquidity premium.
6C o n c l u s i o n
I have presented an asset-pricing model in which ﬁnancial assets are valued for their liquidity–
the degree to which they are valued as a medium of exchange–as well as for being claims
to streams of consumption. The key implications of the model for average asset returns, the
equity-premium and risk-free rate puzzles, were explored analytically and quantitatively.
Explicitly modeling the exchange process, and allowing for the possibility that the value of
equity shares and bonds may partly depend on the role that each plays in exchange, rationalizes
the two most commonly addressed asset-pricing anomalies. Quantitatively, the model performs
negative covariance of equity returns with the MRS.
36The fourth term in (22), cov( ˆ R
b,L
b), is negative, but zero to the ﬁfth decimal, as a percentage.
41better than the Mehra—Prescott frictionless benchmark, even if shares are just as useful as
bonds for exchange purposes. But with standard constant relative risk aversion preferences, it
still takes a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of about 10 for the model to be consistent with
asset return data.
If, in addition, one allows for the fact that bonds may be (slightly) better suited than equity
shares to play the medium-of-exchange role, then the model is able to match the historical aver-
age return to equity and the risk-free rate for the United States with values of the risk aversion
coeﬃcient between 3 and 5. These results indicate that prying deeper into the microeconomics
of the decentralized exchange process may add to our understanding of how asset prices are
determined in actual economies.
Kocherlakota (1996) ended his survey on the equity premium puzzle by drawing a parallel
between the pure theory of money–much of which seeks to understand issues such as the
coexistence of interest-bearing risk-free nominal bonds and ﬁat money–and the branch of
ﬁnancial economics that deals with the equity-premium puzzle. He argued that “we must seek
to identify what fundamental features of goods and asset markets lead to large risk-adjusted
price diﬀerences between stocks and bonds.” And he concluded with, “While I have no idea
what these ‘fundamental features’ are, it is my belief that any true resolution to the equity
premium puzzle lies in ﬁnding them.”
In this paper, I have tried to pursue this line of reasoning a step further. I have advanced
some candidate “fundamental features.” These features are those that go into making an asset a
medium of exchange, which–aside from the measured properties of the asset–are bound to be
related to the frequency of trade, the determination of the terms of trade, and the nature of the
information structure. I have also asked whether these features stand a chance quantitatively.
They do.
Having identiﬁed these features, at a deeper level, the key issue becomes, why is asset X
more generally accepted or better suited than asset Y to function as a medium of exchange? In
terms of the equity premium, the next step is to explain precisely how these particular features
42can lead to diﬀerences in acceptability or, more generally, in the readiness for exchange between
equity and bonds. In this regard, Kocherlakota (2003) and Zhu and Wallace (2005) may provide
some valuable hints.
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48A Appendix
A.1 Euler equations
Here I show how to derive the Euler equations (2) and (3). First, note that the bargaining
solution derived at the end of Section 2, and the fact that W
£
a + pi (a,˜ a),s
¤
= W (a,s)+

















on the agent’s maximization problem in the centralized market, i.e., (1). The optimal choices











































































t, (26) can be rewritten as (2)—(5).
A.2 Equilibrium allocations and prices
In this section, I derive the full set of equilibrium allocations and prices for the economy of
Section 4. Given that U (c)=u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ and that the supply of bonds is set according to
49the rule Bt+1 = f (dt,x t)=Bidt if xt = γi, and focusing on recursive equilibria where share
prices are homogeneous of degree one in d, leads to (14)—(17). The equilibrium asset prices are
φs (d,i)=φs







i=1 solve (14) and (15) for i =1 ,...,n.T h e
decision rules for bond holdings, shares, and consumption are ab (d,i)=Bid, as (d,i)=1and
c(d,i)=d, respectively.
A buyer who enters a bilateral meeting holding a =( as,a b) in a period where the state is
(d,i) has a portfolio that is worth (d + φs
id)as +ab in terms of fruit in the round of centralized
trade that follows.37 Such a buyer purchases
q(abd−σ;κd)=m i n
(










in a decentralized meeting in which he can pay only with bonds, or
q[(d + φs



















in a meeting in which he can pay with bonds or shares. Along the equilibrium path, if the state
today is (dt,i), all agents bring as (dt,i)=1and ab (dt,i)=Bidt into the following period’s
round of decentralized trade. Note that if in the following period the state is (dt+1,j),t h e n
the bond holdings of agents in that period, ab (dt,i), can be written as Bi
γj dt+1. Thus, along
the equilibrium path, in a period where the state is (d,j) and the outstanding stock of bonds
is Bi














































,w i t h
λ
b (d)=U




i)d.I n t u i t i v e l y ,λ
b (d,i) and λ
s (d,i) are the end-of-period values (in
terms of marginal utility of apples) of a bond and a share, respectively, in a period where the state is (d,i).

















with real value (in terms of apples)
(1 + φs














where 0 ≤ ps ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ pb ≤ Bi
γj d. The real value of the portfolio that changes hands is
pinned down, but the precise composition is indeterminate.38
To derive equilibrium real wage (wt) and the remaining individual choices, namely, labor
demand (nt), consumption of general goods in the second subperiod (yt), and labor supply (ht),
we need to parametrize v (·) and At.L e tv(y)=
y1−σ
1−σ , At = AZ1−σ
t , where σ and A are positive
constants, and recall that Zt = dt.39 Then, (24) and (25) imply w(d)=Ad, n(d)=n∗,a n d
y(d)=n∗d, where n∗ = A−1/σ.
Finally, along the equilibrium path, an agent who enters the centralized market with port-
folio (ab
t,a s
t) at the end of period t chooses to work










38This is also a feature that can be found in Lagos and Rocheteau (2004), a version of Lagos and Wright (2005)
where capital goods and ﬁat money compete as media of exchange.
39Setting At = AZ
1−σ
t means that the disutility from work depends on the level of technology of the economy.
This speciﬁcation is useful for two reasons. First, it makes the agent’s preferences consistent with balanced
growth. And second, it allows one to derive relatively simple conditions to ensure that the constraints 0 ≤ ht ≤ ¯ n
are slack at all dates and for all states of the world–which must be the case for the distribution of asset holdings
to be degenerate in the equilibrium. Alternatively, one could assume At = Aγ
(1−σ)t,w h e r eγ is the mean
growth rate of the economy, as done in many RBC models (see Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1995), or
Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). This formulation is enough to guarantee that ht has no secular trend, but in the
present context, one would still have to verify that the structure of the shocks and other primitives of the model
are such that the choice of ht is interior for all realizations of the uncertainty. In fact, this should not be too
diﬃcult, for instance, if the variance of the shocks is small, since both formulations coincide if the economy
grows deterministically. To conclude this technical digression, I would like to stress that although the particular
speciﬁcation for At (and v) matters “globally,” i.e., to ensure that the equilibrium is indeed within the class
of those with a degenerate distribution of asset holdings–as was conjectured for the derivations–it does not
matter “locally,” e.g., for the behavior of asset prices. That is, given that the equilibrium distribution of asset
holdings is degenerate, asset prices are independent of At and v. Observe that (14)—(17) were derived before
parametrizing At and v.
51Intuitively, agents supply labor to ﬁnance their consumption of the general good (the ﬁrst term)
and possibly also to rebalance their portfolios.40
Recall that the analysis has been predicated on the premise that the distribution of assets is
degenerate at the beginning of each decentralized round of trade–which will indeed be the case,
as in Lagos and Wright (2005)–provided the constraints 0 ≤ ht ≤ ¯ n are always slack. Next, I
provide two alternative sets of suﬃcient conditions on parameters, such that this is indeed the
case along the equilibrium path. In a period where the state is (d,i) and the outstanding stock
of bonds is
Bj














Along the conjectured equilibrium path, 0 ≤ as ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ ab ≤ 2
Bj
γi d. That is, after a round
of decentralized trade, an agent can enter the centralized market neither with a negative asset
position nor holding more than twice his beginning-of-period portfolio. Thus, the inequalities









γi ), hold along the equilibrium path in a period where the dividend level is d,
the realization of the dividend growth rate is γi, and the outstanding stock of bonds is
Bj
γi d.
Let ∆ =m a x i,j(1 + φs
i +
Bj
γi ), and note that ∆ is independent of A. Then, it follows that
the inequalities A−1/σ − ∆
A ≤ h(Bj,i,d) ≤ A−1/σ + ∆
A hold along the equilibrium path in
every period and all states (i.e., for every d, Bj and i). Thus, ∆ ≤ A
σ−1
σ ≤ A¯ n − ∆ implies
0 ≤ h(Bj,i,d) ≤ ¯ n, for all i, d and Bj,a n di sas u ﬃcient condition for the constraints 0 ≤ ht ≤ ¯ n
to be slack at all dates, with probability one.
An alternative, simpler way to ensure that ht stays oﬀ corners is to interpret it as eﬀort
and proceed as follows. Since the asset-pricing implications of the model are independent of
the speciﬁcation of preferences over general goods, v (y),o n ec a nn o r m a l i z ev (y)=y. Then,





t)=( Bt,1) and therefore chooses ht = n
∗.
52the problem in the centralized market becomes
W (at,st)= m a x
ct,nt,ht,at+1
{U (ct)+Ztnt − Atht + βEV (at+1,st+1)}
s.t. ct + wtnt + φtat+1 =( φs
t + dt)as
t + ab
t + wtht − τt.
Interpreting ht as eﬀort amounts to assuming that ¯ n is arbitrarily large, and then the max-
imization is subject only to 0 ≤ nt and 0 ≤ ht (the nonnegativity constraints on ct and
at+1 will not bind). Assume, as above, that the disutility from work is indexed by the state
of technology; in particular, let At = Zt. Then, the budget constraint implies ht − nt =
1
wt{ct + φtat+1 + τt − [(φs
t + dt)as
t + ab
t]}. This can be substituted into the objective to yield














φtat+1 + βEV (at+1,st+1)].
Since ht = 1
wt{ct + φtat+1 + τt − [(φs
t + dt)as
t + ab
t]} + nt,a n dnt c a nb ec h o s e nt ob ea n y
arbitrary nonnegative number, it follows that the constraint ht ≥ 0 can be made slack at all
dates and states.
A.3 Bond—equity trade-volume bounds
In this section I derive the bond—equity trade-volume bounds discussed in Section 4.3. In
equilibrium, in a period where the state is (d,j) and the outstanding stock of bonds is Bi
γj d,
the portfolio that is traded in meetings where only bonds can be used to pay is p1
ij =( 0 ,p b
ij),
with pb











d. In meetings where both assets can be used in
exchange, the portfolio that is traded is p2
ij =( 1 , Bi
γj d) if the liquidity constraint binds and any
vector (0,0) ≤ (ps
ij,p b
ij) ≤ (1, Bi
γj d) that satisﬁes (27) if it is slack. Given all this, it is possible
to derive an upper and a lower bound for the quantities of bonds and shares traded in each
state, vb
ij and vs
ij. To derive the upper bound, resolve the (potential) indeterminacy in (ˆ ps
ij, ˆ pb
ij),
namely, in the quantities of shares and bonds that get traded in a meeting where either can
be used for payment, by assuming that buyers always follow a spend-bonds-ﬁrst rule.T h i sr u l e





































To derive the lower bound, resolve the indeterminacy in (ˆ ps
ij, ˆ pb
ij) by assuming that buyers follow







































ij are the quantities of assets traded in matches of type 2 when the buyer uses the
spend-bonds-ﬁrst rule, and ps
ij and pb
ij are the assets traded in matches of type 2 when the buyer




ij are general in
that they apply both when the liquidity constraint binds and when it is slack.) Recall that the
total quantities traded in the period are vb
ij = ˆ α
2[θpb
ij +( 1− θ)ˆ pb
ij] and vs
ij =ˆ α(1 − θ)ˆ ps
ij,a n d




















ij =ˆ α(1 − θ)ps
ij
vs




ij are the total quantities of bonds and shares traded under the spend-bonds-ﬁrst
regime, and vb
ij and vs
ij are the total quantities of bonds and shares traded under the spend-
shares-ﬁrst regime. In turn, these bounds can be used to derive upper and lower bounds for












54Finally, the average upper and lower bounds for the ratio of the value of traded bonds (as a
proportion of the value of the outstanding stock of bonds) to the value of traded shares (as a









These bounds can be compared with actual trade volume data to assess the plausibility of the
underlying value of θ.
A.4 Robustness
In this section I verify the robustness of the benchmark results to changes in the values of the
parameters ˆ B, κ,a n dε, the key parameters that were not in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
The benchmark parametrization is perhaps too conservative, in the sense that it biases the
case against the liquidity mechanism by using 0.3 as the target ratio of M1∗ to annual GDP,
which implied ˆ B =0 .75. Tables 7 and 8 are analogous to Tables 3 and 4, but with ˆ B =0 .5,
which is consistent with a ratio of M1∗ to annual GDP of 0.2 (this is roughly the average for
the 1975—1995 period). All the other parameters are kept at their benchmark levels. All entries
corresponding to σ =1through 7 in Table 7 are identical to those in Table 3. In both, the
liquidity constraints bind for σ ≥ 8. When the constraints bind, the asset returns are only
slightly lower in Table 7, as is natural, since the relative scarcity of outside bonds means that
both assets yield larger liquidity returns. The equity premium is essentially unchanged.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 8 are identical to the corresponding columns of Table 4
through σ =7 . Again, equity returns and premia are slightly lower in the economy with lower
ˆ B for higher values of σ. Since the bond to GDP ratio is smaller in this economy, the liquidity
constraint is even more binding in trades where only bonds can circulate, and therefore the
implied values for θ are uniformly lower in Table 8 relative to Table 4. In Table 8, the volume
bounds implied by the values of θ corresponding to σ =5 , 4,a n d3, i.e., those that imply
returns consistent with the data, are [.004,2], [.03,5],a n d[.23,14], respectively.
In the benchmark calibration, I set κ =0 .5 so that the model implies that the fraction of










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 0,0
4 7.89 7.18 0.71 0,0
5 9.42 8.45 0.97 0,0
6 10.88 9.62 1.26 0,0
7 12.24 10.67 1.57 0,0
8 8.70 6.65 2.05 .0010,-.0444
9 5.94 3.50 2.44 .0014,-.0794
10 4.34 1.49 2.85 .0017,-.1028










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0 –
2 4.58 1 3.58 .0316,-.0316 .078000
3 6.27 1 5.27 .0453,-.0453 .026300
4 7.89 1 6.89 .0576,-.0576 .008020
5 9.42 1 8.42 .0687,-.0687 .002080
6 10.88 1 9.88 .0786,-.0786 .000464
7 12.24 1 11.24 .0873,-.0873 9.0×10−5
8 8.70 1 7.70 .0517,-.0950 8.7×10−6
9 5.94 1 4.94 .0237,-.1016 5.8×10−7
10 4.34 1 3.34 .0061,-.1072 1.6×10−8
Table 8: Robustness, lower ˆ B with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
I report how the results change if the share of GDP produced by traded “trees” is in fact larger,
say 0.45. (Recall that the gross value added of the nonﬁnancial corporate business sector as a
share of GDP, i.e., the upper bound on the relevant target, is about 0.5.) Table 8 corresponds
to the economy with κ =2 /9 and ˆ B =0 .6658, which imply that tradeable trees produce 45% of
GDP and that the average bond to GDP ratio is 0.3 (as in the benchmark) and θ =0 .F o rt h i s
parametrization, the liquidity constraints start binding for σ =4 . The equilibrium for lower
values of σ (and hence all entries in the table) are just as in Mehra—Prescott. If we compare
Table 9 with Table 3, it is apparent that liquidity constraints are tighter in the economy with
56lower κ.41 First, they start binding for lower values of σ (i.e., 4 as opposed to 8), and second,
they are tighter when they both bind. (This is evident from comparing the magnitudes of the
Euler equation wedges in Table 9 to their counterparts in Table 3.) Tighter liquidity constraints
imply that equity and bond returns are uniformly lower in this economy than in the one with
higher κ.F o r σ =9or larger, agents are so eager for liquidity that they are willing to hold
bonds even though their measured return is negative on average (bonds still sell at a discount
in the high state).
Table 10 reports the results for the model with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences. For σ =3
and lower, the ﬁrst four columns are the same as those of Table 4. But for each value of σ,
the implied values of θ are uniformly lower in Table 10, the case with smaller κ.F o rσ =6the
liquidity needs are so severe that there is no positive θ that can induce a risk-free rate as high
as 1%. To summarize, the liquidity mechanism is magniﬁed in parametrizations with smaller
values of κ. This implies that somewhat smaller values of θ are needed to account for the equity
premium.42
Higher values of κ tend to relax the liquidity constraints, and in fact, they will bind in at
least some state of the world iﬀ κ<κ, where
κ =
"









Given that the rest of the parameters and data targets are as in the benchmark, I found that
for targets of the share of GDP produced by trees with tradeable equity that are less than 35%,
there are no liquidity needs in any state.43
41With CRRA preferences, the diﬀerence u[(1 +  )κ] − u(κ) is decreasing in κ for σ>1.T h i s d i ﬀerence is
essentially what determines the size of the right-hand side of the inequalities that appear in the deﬁnitions of
the sets Ω and Ωθ in (20) and (21). Thus, the liquidity mechanism is stronger for smaller κ.
42The volume bounds do not appear too sensitive, e.g., those corresponding to σ =3are now [.69,20].
43If this target is set slightly higher–at 36%, for example–then the liquidity constraints are slack in all trades,
even those where only bonds can be used, up to σ =7 .F o r σ =8and σ =9 ,s e t t i n gθ =1is not enough of
a liquidity advantage on bonds to bring their return down to 1%.W i t hσ =8and θ =1 , the risk-free rate is
11.27%, virtually as high as in the Mehra—Prescott economy. With σ =9and θ =1 , the risk-free rate is 6%,
half of what it would be for Mehra—Prescott, but still high. With σ =1 0 , setting θ =0 .7 induces a risk-free rate
of 1%,a n dt h er e t u r no ne q u i t yi s15.79%, essentially the same as in Mehra—Prescott. (With σ =1 0 , θ =0 .7










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 0,0
4 6.33 5.58 0.75 .0003,-.0149
5 3.15 2.13 1.02 .0006,-.0584
6 2.29 0.96 1.33 .0008,-.0790
7 2.10 0.43 1.67 .0011,-.0926
8 2.08 0.04 2.04 .0014,-.1036
9 2.12 -0.31 2.43 .0016,-.1133
10 2.18 -0.67 2.85 .0019,-.1219










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0 –
2 4.58 1 3.58 .0316,-.0316 .0260
3 6.27 1 5.27 .0453,-.0453 .022×10−1
4 6.33 1 5.33 .0430,-.0576 .011×10−2
5 3.15 1 2.15 .0110,-.0687 17×10−7
6 2.29 0.96 1.33 .0008,-.0790 0
Table 10: Robustness, lower κ with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
In the baseline calibration, I use   =0 .8. Now suppose   =0 .5, and keep all other parameters
as in the benchmark. Tables 11 and 12 are very similar to Tables 3 and 4, so the key results
appear robust to lowering ε. The volume bounds implied by the values of θ corresponding to
σ =5 , 4,a n d3 in Table 12 are [.05,3], [.3,8],a n d[3,43], respectively.
Next, consider the parametrization with   =1 , and keep all other parameters at their
benchmark values. The results for the case with θ =0and for the one where θ is chosen so that
t h er i s k - f r e er a t ei s1% are reported in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. The results do not seem
to be altered much by increasing   away from its benchmark value. For example, in Table 14,
the volume bounds implied by the values of θ corresponding to σ =5 , 4,a n d3 are [.007,2.4],










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 0,0
4 7.89 7.18 0.71 0,0
5 9.42 8.45 0.97 0,0
6 10.88 9.62 1.26 0,0
7 12.24 10.67 1.57 0,0
8 9.13 7.09 2.04 .0009,-.0405
9 6.11 3.69 2.42 .0013,-.0777
10 4.41 1.57 2.84 .0017,-.1021










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0 –
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 0,0 –
3 6.27 1 5.27 .0453,-.0453 .218
4 7.89 1 6.89 .0576,-.0576 .060
5 9.42 1 8.42 .0687,-.0687 .020
6 10.88 1 9.88 .0786,-.0786 0.06×10−1
7 12.24 1 11.24 .0873,-.0873 0.02×10−1
8 9.13 1 8.13 .0555,-.0950 3.49×10−4
9 6.11 1 5.11 .0252,-.1016 4.20×10−5
10 4.41 1 3.41 .0067,-.1072 2.38×10−6
Table 12: Robustness,   =0 .5 with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
The choice of   has implications for consumption inequality. In the benchmark calibration
with   =0 .8, the variance of the log of total (i.e., including general goods and fruit in both sub-
periods) per capita consumption is 0.013, and the variance of the log of per capita consumption
in the ﬁrst subperiod (which is the only source of consumption inequality in the model) is 0.67.
The parametrization with   =0 .5 used to generate Tables 11 and 12 implies that the variance
of the log of total consumption equals 0.005, whereas the variance of the log of consumption in










1 2.8301 2.7038 .1262 0,0
2 4.5842 4.2973 .2868 0,0
3 6.2722 5.7905 .4817 0,0
4 7.8871 7.1774 .7097 0,0
5 9.4238 8.4542 .9696 0,0
6 10.8780 9.6180 1.260 0,0
7 12.2454 10.6663 1.579 0,0
8 8.7428 6.6923 2.0506 .00100,-.04400
9 5.9525 3.5163 2.4362 .00138,-.07924
10 4.3440 1.4950 2.8489 .00170,-.10280










1 2.83 2.70 0.13 0,0 –
2 4.58 1 3.58 .0316,-.0316 .1693
3 6.27 1 5.27 .0453,-.0453 .0467
4 7.89 1 6.89 .0576,-.0576 .0140
5 9.42 1 8.42 .0687,-.0687 .037×10−1
6 10.88 1 9.88 .0786,-.0786 .083×10−2
7 12.24 1 11.24 .0873,-.0873 1.62×10−4
8 8.74 1 7.74 .0520,-.0950 1.57×10−5
9 5.95 1 4.95 .0238,-.1016 1.02×10−6
10 4.34 1 3.34 .0061,-.1072 2.71×10−8
Table 14: Robustness,   =1with exogenous liquidity diﬀerences
A.5 Generalized Nash bargaining
So far, in the determination of the terms of trade in decentralized meetings, I have focused on the
formulation in which the buyer (the agent with the low endowment) makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer. Here I show how to generalize the theoretical analysis to the case where the terms of
trade are instead determined according to the Nash bargaining solution with bargaining power
η ∈ [0,1] for the buyer and 1−η for the seller. At the end of this section, I also report how the
baseline quantitative results of Section 4.2, which assumed η =1 ,d e p e n do nt h ev a l u eo fη.
As it will become clear below, having η<1 introduces the possibility that buyers may
60be better oﬀ not bringing all the assets they own to the bargaining table. For this reason, I
generalize the model to allow agents to choose which part of their portfolios to bring into a
meeting. For j = h,l,l e tˆ Vj (a,s)=m a x ˆ a≤aVj (ˆ a,s), where Vh (a,s) and Vl (a,s) are as in
Section 2, and ˆ a =( ˆ ab,ˆ as) is the portfolio that the agent chooses to bring into the random
matching round. (The timing is that the agent chooses ˆ a right before the bargaining takes
place, but after having learned the realization of the aggregate shock, his individual endowment












































){u[(1 −  )κd]+W (a,s)}.
The value of an agent who enters the centralized market holding portfolio at in a period when
the aggregate state of the economy is st,n a m e l y ,W (at,st),i ss t i l lg i v e nb y( 1 ) ,b u tw i t h
V (a,s)=1






























a + pi (˜ a,ˆ a),s
¤ª
dG(˜ a)]
+(1− 2α)[¯ u(d)+W (a,s)].
Consider a meeting of type i in the decentralized market between a buyer who owns portfolio
a and brings ˆ a ≤ a to the meeting, and a seller who owns ˜ a and brings ˜ a0 to the meeting.
The terms of trade [qi(ˆ a,˜ a0),pi(ˆ a,˜ a0)],f o ri =1 ,2, are determined by Nash bargaining. Let
ub (q) ≡ u[(1 −  )κd + q] − u[(1 −  )κd] and cs (q) ≡ u[(1 +  )κd] − u[(1 +  )κd − q]. Then,
for i =1 ,2, the terms of trade (qi,pi) maximize
£
ub(qi)+W(a − pi,s) − W(a,s)
¤η £
−cs(qi)+W(˜ a + pi,s) − W(˜ a,s)
¤1−η
61subject to p1 =( pb,0) and pb ≤ ˆ ab if i =1(matches where only bonds can be used as means
of payment), or subject to p2 =( pb,p s) ≤ ˆ a if i =2(matches where both bonds and shares
c a nb eu s e df o rp a y m e n t ) .I na nu n r e s t r i c t e dm a t c h ,t h ea g e n tc a n n o ts p e n dm o r et h a na l lt h e
assets he chooses to bring into the meeting. And in a restricted match, he cannot spend more
than all the bonds he brings into the meeting. Let
q(z;κd)=
½
 κd if z ≥ gη ( κd)




b (q)cs (q)+( 1− η)c0
s (q)ub (q)
ηu0
b (q)+( 1− η)c0
s (q)
, (29)
and qη (z;κd) denotes the q that solves gη (q)=z.F o r i =1 ,2, the bargaining solution in
period t is qi(ˆ at,˜ a0
t)=q(λi
tˆ at;κdt), where λ1
t ≡ (λb
t,0),a n dλ2
t = λt.I n t u i t i v e l y ,q(z;κd) is the
quantity of coconuts that get traded in a meeting in which the buyer brings portfolio with real
value z to the bargaining table, during a period when the aggregate endowment of coconuts is



























Using the fact that W[a + pi (a,˜ a),s]=W (a,s)+λpi (a,˜ a) and the bargaining solution,






Γb(λiˆ a)+αΓs +¯ u(d), (31)
where
Γb (z) ≡ ub [q(z;κd)] − gη [q(z;κd)]
is expected gain from trade when the agent acts as a buyer and carries a portfolio with real




−cs[q(λi˜ a;κd)] + gη[q(λi˜ a;κdt)]
ª
dG(˜ a)
is the expected gain from trade when he acts as a seller.
62Consider the problem maxz Γb (z), i.e., the unconstrained version of the maximization prob-
lems in the second and third terms of (31). First, notice that according to the bargaining
solution, Γb (z) is constant for all z ≥ gη ( κd). Moreover, note that as z approaches gη ( κd)
from below,
g0









Thus, limz↑gη( κd) Γ0




2 } ≤ 0,w i t hs t r i c ti n -
equality unless η =1 . Therefore, maxz≥0 Γb (z)=m a x 0≤z≤gη( κd) Γb (z). Since the objective
function is continuous and the choice set compact, a solution z∗
b exists for this problem. Given
z∗
b,l e tq∗
b be deﬁned by gη (q∗
b)=z∗
b.I n t u i t i v e l y ,q∗
b is the quantity traded that maximizes the
buyer’s gains from trade in the bilateral meeting, and z∗
b is the real value of assets needed to
purchase this quantity.
The previous reasoning implies that z∗
b <g η ( κd) and q∗
b <  κ dfor η ∈ [0,1),b u tq∗
b =  κd if
η =1 .T h u s ,t h es o l u t i o nt omaxˆ a≤aΓb(λiˆ a) takes the following form. If λia ≥gη (q∗
b), then the
buyer only brings a portfolio ˆ a ≤ a such that λiˆ a = gη (q∗
b) to the bilateral match, and purchases
q∗
b from the seller. (If η =1 , he brings any portfolio ˆ a ≤ a such that λiˆ a ≥ u[(1 +  )κd]−u(κd)
and purchases  κd from the seller.) Conversely, if λia <gη (q∗
b), then the buyer brings all the





b if z ≥ gη (q∗
b)
qη (z;κd) if z<g η (q∗
b).
Intuitively, qb (z;κd) is the quantity of coconuts that get traded in a meeting between a seller
a n dab u y e rw h oowns portfolio with real value z.T h i si st ob ec o n t r a s t e dw i t hq(z;κd),w h i c h
was the quantity of coconuts that get traded in a meeting where the buyer brings portfolio
with real value z to the bargaining table.T h u s ,f o ri =1 ,2, the bargaining solution in period
44This second part presumes that Γb (z) is nondecreasing on [0,z
∗
b], as will be the case in the parametrizations
I will consider. Otherwise the agent may sometimes prefer not to bring all the assets he owns into the bilateral
bargain, even though λ
ia <gη (q
∗
b). More generally, the statement is that if λ
ia <gη (q
∗
b), then the buyer brings
into the bilateral match a portfolio ˆ a ≤ a such that λ




63t, taking into account the buyer’s choice of which portfolio to bring to the bargaining table,
implies that–in a period when the aggregate endowment of coconuts is κdt–the quantity










θiSb(λia;d)+W (a,s)+αΓs +¯ u(d), (32)
where Sb(λia;d)=ub[qb(λia;κd)] − gη[qb(λia;κd)]. Then, focus on the agent’s maximization
problem in the centralized market, i.e., (1). The optimal choices of ct and nt still satisfy (24)









































































































b (qb [U0 (dt+1)Bt+1;κdt+1])
g0




where I have let θ ≡ θ1 to simplify the notation. Note that (33)—(36) generalize (2)—(5) to the
case of an arbitrary bargaining power η ∈ [0,1].
64Now suppose that U (c)=u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ ,w i t h0 <σ<∞. For this parametrization,
qb (z;κdt+1), i.e., the quantity of coconuts traded in a meeting where the buyer can pay from a




b if z ≥ gη (q∗
b)
qη (z;κd) if z<g η (q∗
b).
where q∗
b =a r gm a x q [ub (q) − gη (q)],a n dqη (z;κd) is the q that solves
gη (q)=z, (37)

























I again specify that the government chooses the stock of bonds according to a policy rule
Bt+1 = f (dt,x t), where f (dt,x t)= ˆ BE[dt+1|(dt,i)] if xt = γi,a n dw i t h ˆ B ≥ 0.T h u s , i f
dt+1 = xt+1dt,w i t hxt = γi and xt+1 = γj,w eh a v eBt+1 = Bidt = Bi
γj dt+1. As before,
I focus on equilibria that are stationary in growth rates, with share prices homogeneous of
degree one in d,s ot h a tφs (d,j)=φs
jd,w h e r eφs
j is a constant. Also, this implies that φb (d,i)
is independent of d,s oIc a nw r i t eφb
i = φb (d,i). Now consider a period t +1in which
dt+1 = xt+1dt,w i t hxt = γi and xt+1 = γj. In such a period, the quantity traded in bilateral
meetings is min{qη (zt+1;κdt+1),q∗
b},w i t hzt+1 =( 1+φs
j + Bi
γj )d1−σ
t+1 in unrestricted matches
and zt+1 = Bi
γj d1−σ
t+1 in restricted matches.
The ﬁrst observation is that just as in the case with η =1 , the quantity traded when the
buyer is unconstrained, i.e., q∗
b, is linear in the aggregate dividend, d. To see this, notice that

















η[(1− )κ+Q]−σ+(1−η)[(1+ )κ−Q]−σ ,
where Q = q/d.L e t¯ q∗
b denote the solution to the latter problem. Then, q∗
b =¯ q∗
bd.
65The second observation is that also as in the case with η =1 , the quantity traded that
solves (37) is linear in the aggregate dividend, d,b o t hi nr e s t r i c t e da n di nu n r e s t r i c t e dm a t c h e s .
Consider restricted matches; i.e., set z = Bi



















where Q = q/d. This equation implies that Q is independent of d, or equivalently, that the
quantity traded in restricted matches is min{¯ q1
ij, ¯ q∗
b}d,w h e r e¯ q1
ij is the Q that solves (38), which
is independent of d. A similar argument implies that in unrestricted matches, the quantity
traded is min{¯ q2
ij(φs
j), ¯ q∗
b}d, where ¯ q2
ij(φs



























ijd in restricted matches.
Since qb[(1+φs
j + Bi




γj d1−σ;κd)=m i n {¯ q1
ij, ¯ q∗
b}d,( 3 5 )
and (36) become
Ls































b(qd)=[ ( 1−  )κ + q]−σd−σ and g0
η(qd) specializes to
©
η∆1(q)[(1 +  )κ − q]−σ +( 1− η)∆2(q)[(1 −  )κ + q)]−σ + η(1 − η)Ψ(q)
ª
d−σ














1−σ){[(1+ )κ−q]−σ−1[(1− )κ+q]−σ+[(1− )κ+q]−σ−1[(1+ )κ−q]−σ}
{η[(1− )κ+q]−σ+(1−η)[(1+ )κ−q]−σ} ×
{[(1− )κ+q]1−σ+[(1+ )κ−q]1−σ−[(1− )κ]1−σ−[(1+ )κ]1−σ}







t+1, so the liquidity factors Ls
t+1 and
Lb
t+1 in (39) and (40) are independent of dt+1.
From (29) and (30), and (33)—(36), it is clear that as η → 1, the equilibrium reduces to
the one studied in Section 4. Conversely, as η → 0, g0
η(q) → u0
b (q), and therefore Ls
ij → 1 and
Lb
ij → 1 for all i and j. If buyers have no bargaining power, assets have no value in exchange,
and consequently, their value stems only from the streams of dividends they yield.
Table 15 reports the average equity return (ER), bond return (BR), and equity premium
(EP) for η =0 , 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,a n d1,a n dv a l u e so fσ ranging from 1 to 10. Table 15 generalizes
Table 3, which assumed η =1 .
η = 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
σ ER BR EP ER BR EP ER BR EP ER BR EP ER BR EP
1 2.83 2.70 0.13 2.83 2.70 0.13 2.83 2.70 0.13 2.83 2.70 0.13 2.83 2.70 0.13
2 4.58 4.30 0.28 4.58 4.30 0.28 4.58 4.30 0.28 4.58 4.30 0.28 4.58 4.30 0.28
3 6.27 5.79 0.48 6.27 5.79 0.48 6.27 5.79 0.48 6.27 5.79 0.48 6.27 5.79 0.48
4 7.89 7.18 0.71 7.89 7.18 0.71 7.89 7.18 0.71 7.89 7.18 0.71 7.89 7.18 0.71
5 9.42 8.45 0.97 5.27 4.27 1.00 6.95 5.94 1.01 9.25 8.27 0.98 9.42 8.45 0.97
6 10.88 9.62 1.26 3.09 1.80 1.29 3.69 2.40 1.29 4.59 3.30 1.29 10.88 9.62 1.26
7 12.24 10.67 1.57 2.37 0.75 1.62 2.57 0.95 1.62 2.88 1.26 1.62 12.24 10.67 1.57
8 13.52 11.60 1.92 2.17 0.20 1.97 2.23 0.26 1.97 2.33 0.36 1.97 8.80 6.76 2.04
9 14.70 12.41 2.29 2.14 -0.21 2.35 2.16 -0.19 2.35 2.19 -0.16 2.35 5.97 3.54 2.43
10 15.79 13.10 2.69 2.17 -0.58 2.75 2.18 -0.57 2.75 2.19 -0.56 2.75 4.35 1.50 2.85
Table 15: Bargaining power in the baseline economy with θ =0
First, note that as discussed above, η =0implies that assets provide no liquidity services,
i.e., that Ls
ij = Lb
ij =1for all i and j. Thus, for every value of σ, the asset returns corresponding
to η =0are identical to those of the Mehra—Prescott model reported in Table 2. Second, note
that the asset returns in the column labeled η =1correspond to the returns in Table 3. For
relatively low values of σ, e.g., σ ≤ 3, the equilibrium is independent of η. In particular, the
trading constraints are slack in every state of the world for these values of σ (i.e., Ls
ij = Lb
ij =1
for all i and j), so asset returns for σ =1through 3 in Table 15 are the same as in the
67Mehra—Prescott economy of Table 2.45
Recall that in Section 4.2 I reported that for σ ≤ 7, the returns in the economy with η =1
were the same as in Mehra—Prescott. Table 15 shows that this is not the case for η<1.F o r
example, consider the economy with σ =5 . Note that asset returns are indeed the same for the
Mehra—Prescott economy (e.g., η =0 ) and the economy of Section 4.2 (η =1 ). However, the
equity and bond returns are U-shaped, and the equity premium is hump-shaped with respect
to η. For example, the implied equity premium is 0.97% if η =0 , 1% if η =0 .25, 1.01% if
η =0 .5, 0.98% if η =0 .75, and again 0.97% if η =1 . The reason for this nonmonotonicity is
that a reduction in η has two opposing eﬀects.
First, a smaller η means that at the margin, the buyer gets fewer coconuts per unit of assets
and reaps smaller gains from trade in decentralized exchanges, which tends to reduce the value
of assets as a medium of exchange, and hence their liquidity return. But on the other hand,
there is a corresponding general equilibrium eﬀect, namely, that since assets are less valuable
in exchange, their prices tend to be lower (agents would like to hold less of them, but they all
have to be held in equilibrium), and this tends to tighten the trading constraints, so when they
bind, assets are more valuable in exchange at the margin. The former eﬀect tends to dominate
for low values of η, and the latter for relatively large values. Interestingly, for intermediate
values of σ, e.g., between (and including) 4 and 7, the equity premia reported in Section 4.2
for the case of η =1are only lower bounds relative to the premia that can be generated with
intermediate bargaining powers. Conversely, for relatively large values of σ, e.g., 8 through 10,
for intermediate values of η one ﬁnds equity premia that are smaller–if only slightly–than
those of Section 4.2. For example, 2.75% instead of 2.85% for σ =1 0 . From the results in Table
15, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ﬁndings reported in Section 4.2 are robust relative
to the precise parametrization of the buyer’s bargaining power.
45The equilibrium is not independent of η for σ =4 , despite the fact that the returns are the same across the
values of η reported in Table 15. For example, if σ =4and η =0 .05, then the equity return is 6.78%,t h eb o n d
return 6.04%, and the equity premium 0.74%.I nt h i sc a s e ,Ω(Bi)={1,2} for all i. There are also more intricate
binding patterns for other values of η. For instance, for σ =4and η =0 .08,o n eﬁnds Ω(B1)=Ω(B2)={2}.
That is, in this economy the assets yield a liquidity return only in the low-growth state.
68In terms of the binding patterns for each parametrization, for σ =8 ,9,10, Ω(Bi)={1,2}
for all i and all values of η.F o rσ =7 , Ω(Bi)=∅ for all i,i fη =1 ,b u tΩ(Bi)={1,2} for
intermediate values of η, e.g., ranging from (and including) 0.001 and 0.999.F o rσ =6 ,t h es e t s
Ω(Bi) of states in which the assets yield a liquidity return depend more subtly on the value of η.
Speciﬁcally, assets yield a liquidity return in all states, i.e., Ω(Bi)={1,2} for all i,i fη ≤ 0.986.
If η is larger than 0.986 b u ts m a l l e rt h a no re q u a lt o0.991,t h e nΩ(B1)=Ω(B2)={2}, i.e.,
assets yield a liquidity return only in the low-growth state. Finally, Ω(Bi)=∅ for all i,i fη is
larger than 0.991. Similar binding patterns are found for σ =5and 4.
So far I have explored the quantitative implications of varying η but only in the context
of economies with no exogenous liquidity diﬀerences between bonds and equity, i.e., only in
economies with θ =0 . To conclude, I report how the economy corresponding to the fourth row
of Table 4, namely, the baseline parametrization but with σ =4and θ =0 .0222,b e h a v e sa sη
varies.
Figure 6: Bargaining power and asset returns for the baseline economy (σ =4and θ =0 .0222)
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 6 displays the equity and bond returns, and the second panel the
equity premium, all as functions of η. Note that at η =1t h eb o n dr e t u r ni se x a c t l y1% and
the equity premium 6.89%, as is to be expected from the fourth row of Table 4. Bonds yield a
69liquidity return in all states of the world, i.e., Ωθ (Bi)={1,2} for i =1and 2. Equity yields a
liquidity return only for relatively low values of η, e.g., less than 0.089, but for higher values,
Ω(Bi)=∅ for i =1and 2. (This is the point at which the equity return becomes ﬂat in the left
panel.) Note that depending on the value of η, the bond return can be extremely low, almost
−30%, and as high as 1%. Accordingly, the equity premium can range from 0.7% (for η =0 )
to 36% (for η =0 .075)o r6.89% (for η =1 ). From Figure 6 it seems clear that, once again,
the equity premia reported in Section 4.2 are–if anything–on the low side of the magnitudes
that can be generated by the theory if buyers have some, but not all, the bargaining power in
decentralized trades.
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